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This nation is committed to the individual income tax as its prin-
cipal source of revenue. Since 1958, the federal government has col-
lected more money from the individual income tax than from all other
taxes combined,' and the proportion is rising. Congress enacted legisla-
tion in 1965 that will more than double the per capita burden of the
Social Security system 2 -another form of individual income tax-and
repealed or reduced several important taxes not based on income.3
Thirty-seven states levy a tax on individual incomes, 4 along with many
municipalities,5 including New York.6 All proposals for increased public
spending in the cities7 rely heavily upon an individual income tax.8
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1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CExsus, HIsroRIcAL STAT'mcs OF Tim UNrrD STATES, CoLO NIL
T IEs TO 1957, Ser. 259-77 [hereinafter cited as HLsrOucAL STATISICs]. Sec also
a companion volume to the above publication, CONTINUATION TO 192 AN.D REvwIoNS
[hereinafter cited as CONTINUATION AND REvIsIONs].
2. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 280.
3. Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, 79 Stat. 136.
4. U.S. ADviSORY COMM'N ON INTR OVERNAtENTAL RELATIONs, T,x OE-mLPPNC w, Tim
UNrrED STATEs 25, 141 (1964).
5. Id. at 140-42 (29 cities with population of 50,000 or more had an indiidual income
tax as of January 1, 1964).
6. Laws of the City of New York, 1966, chs. 773, 774 (July 1, 1966).
7. See Heller, Deductions and Credits for State Income Taxes, 51 Ky. Lj. 260, 264-67
(1962); R. MARTIN, THE CrmEs AND TI[E FEDERAL SYSr, 13-19 (1965); J. Alsop, The Wash-
ington Post, March 50, 1966, at A-25, cols. 1-3.
8. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 7 passim (proposal to permit a portion of state or local
income taxes to be credited against the federal income tax); Alsop, supra note 7 (proposal
to refund part of federal income tax collected in a metropolitan area to the core city).
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This method of taxation has become so important that any fault in the
individual income tax is now, ipso facto, a fault in the American tax
system as a whole.
Yet income tax laws barely touch what has become one of the most
important and highly concentrated kinds of individual income: the
annual increment in value of publicly traded corporate stock. Such
holdings now constitute about a fourth of the nation's wealth; more
than 70 per cent of it is held by or for the wealthiest one per cent of
the population. The corporations that issued it typically have thou-
sands of shareholders, few of whom exercise significant control over
corporate operations. These companies obtain most of their funds for
reinvestment from their earnings and almost all the rest from borrow-
ing, and once established, they seldom issue more stock. Their self.
sustained growth proceeds rapidly, at a faster pace than the rest of the
economy. Their stock prices grow apace.
Shareholders with other sufficient sources of income can allow this
stock appreciation to continue indefinitely; if they should need to sell,
their assets are as liquid as a bank deposit. Their relationship to the
process that produces their wealth is as passive as that of a depositor to
his bank. But unlike depositors, shareholders enjoy substantial tax
immunities. They realize only a small part of their profits as taxable
dividends. Most corporate profits are reinvested in the company and
reflected as appreciation in the value of its stock. Under present law
less than a sixth of such appreciation is ever reported, and then usually
not until years after it has accrued. Even then it is taxed at only a
fraction of the rate applicable to other income. The consequent loss of
revenue is immense, amounting to thirty to fifty per cent of total fed-
eral individual income tax receipts. An equally important result is that
income tax liability does not even roughly correspond to ability to pay,
because corporate stock is so intensely concentrated among the wealthy.
It is the thesis of this article that publicly held corporations, having
grown independent of their scattered shareholders and the equity
capital market, no longer require the tax incentives which encourage
investment in their outstanding stock. These tax privileges, by un-
necessarily favoring wealthy investors and passive accumulation, un-
justly burden the talented and the energetic as well as the poor. If
appreciation of publicly-traded stock were taxed annually as ordinary
income, whether or not the stock was sold, the tax system would be-
come genuinely progressive without impairing industry's accumulation
of capital.
A conceptual difficulty with this proposal is its frank treatment of
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what has not been sold-what is "unrealized"--as "income." To date,
such treatment has been used only as a marginal device to prevent tax
avoidance by premature gifts of about-to-be realized assets, transfer of
high-income property to private trusts, failure to call callable obliga-
tions, and the like.9 It does not yet occupy a prominent place in in-
come tax law o0 or, especially, in the layman's financial thinking. The
typical homeowner, for example, does not consider an upward fluctua-
tion in the value of his house as income. But even conventional
thinking treats unrealized appreciation as income in some situations.
For example, a depositor probably considers the rising value of his
savings account as income whether or not the account is withdrawn.
The Internal Revenue Service certainly takes that view.'1
Liquidity and measurability characterize the kind of appreciation
that can also be regarded as "income." Liquidity is here used in its
broadest sense, taking into account any reasonable obstacle to con-
verting property to cash-factual, legal or subjective. When all the
barriers to conversion are low, the increased value of appreciated
property is indistinguishable from cash in its effect on the owner's
ability to pay, and ability to pay is the touchstone of liability for an
income tax.
Measurability is necessary simply because if appreciation is taxed
before property is sold, there must be some convenient measure of its
amount other than the price realized on an actual sale. Measurability
thus operates as a practical limit on how close the individual income
tax can approach its own ideal of matching tax liability to ability to
pay.
A few illustrations may clarify the use of the terms. Unimproved
real estate held as an investment and located in or near a populated
9. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957) (constructive receipt of income); Rev. Rul.
66-44 and Rev. Rul 66-45, 1966 INT. Rv. BuLl. no. 9 (interest accrued in respect to
bank savings certificates, even though not payable until certificate for both principal
and interest is surrendered, is "income" even to a cash basis taxpayer); Corls v. Blowers,
281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930) ("The income that is subject to a man's unfettered command and
that he is free to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as his income, whether
he sees fit to enjoy it or not."-income of a revocable trust); Hedrick v. Commissioner,
154 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 719 (1946) (uncasbed check); Thomas
Watson, 12 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MErt. DEc. 1411 (1943) (interest accrued to account);
Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945) (right to proceeds from law suit
which seemed certain to be won but on which judgment had not yet been entered). See
also 2 AfERTNs, LAW or FrDEA. INco.m TAXATION § 12.39, at 129-30 ("A taxpayer may
not turn his back upon income and postpone the Iear of its recognition for tax purposes
by choosing not to actually receive income which is available to him. [Such income] ...
is taxable when the amount is ascertained and available to the taxpayer without
restriction or is subject to his control.!).
10. Cf. BROWNLEE & ALLEN, ECONOMICS OF Punuc FINANCE 242-47 id ed. 1954); SiMo%,
PERSONAL INCOm TAXATION 50-51 (1938).
11. Thomas Watson, 12 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MET. DEC. 1141 (1943).
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area is usually highly liquid, because buyers are not hard to find and
because a sale of the property, by hypothesis, will deprive the seller of
nothing except its investment value. But since every parcel of real
estate is to an extent different from every other, smoothly functioning
markets or "exchanges" in which they can be bought and sold at
predictable prices do not exist. On the other hand, real estate which the
owner occupies as a residence or operates for a profit, for example, a
farm or a restaurant, is normally neither readily measurable in value
nor readily liquidable, because a sale would materially inconvenience
the seller.
But publicly traded stocks amply meet both the test of liquidity and
of measurability. They can be sold quickly, easily and at a known
price. For reasons that will be shown, their sale has no detrimental
effect on the corporation or the economy and imposes no extraordi-
nary hardship on the selling shareholder. Appreciation of publicly
held stock therefore must be regarded as income if the income tax is
to remain true to its own basic rationale, ability to pay, within the
limits of measurability. How such stock could be fitted into the scheme
of the individual income tax, and why that is both possible and de-
sirable, remain to be discussed.
I. The Present System of Taxing, and Not Taxing, Capital Apprecia-
tion
Capital appreciation generally receives three tax privileges that in
the case of corporate stock render its appreciation nearly taxfree. First,
it is taxed only when property is sold or exchanged, 12 thus allowing
the owner who retains his property to continue earning a return on
the money he would otherwise have had to pay in taxes. For example,
a thousand dollars of stock appreciating ten per cent per year would
be worth $47,500 in fifty years if the shareholder had to reduce each
year's appreciation by one-fourth in order to pay the maximum income
tax applicable to such gains. The same amount of stock appreciating at
the same rate for the same period without offset for an annual tax is
worth $135,500. The advantage of not having to pay an annual tax is
thus equal to $88,000-almost two-thirds the entire appreciation.
Holding periods of this magnitude are not unusual for corporate
stock. About 85 per cent of it is apparently not sold or otherwise
exchanged in a taxable transaction from one generation to the next.U
12. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1001, 1002 [hereinafter cited as IRCJ.
15. See text accompanying note 16 inflra.
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The second privilege eliminates all taxes on appreciation if the owner
of property dies while holding it. His heir, if he sells the property, is
taxed only on appreciation subsequent to his benefactor's death.14
Finally, when (if ever) appreciation is taxed, it is at a singularly low
rate: either at half what would have been paid had the same amount
been earned as wages or other ordinary income, or at a rate of 25 per
cent, whichever is less.15
The result is to reduce the effective tax rate on corporate stock
appreciation to less than 4 per cent. The first tvo privileges permit
individuals holding appreciated securities to reap the benefits of better
than 85 per cent of their appreciation without ever reporting it,10 and
on the fraction reported the third privilege insures that the tax liabil-
ity is never more than 25 per cent.' 7 The average effective rate on
ordinary income, most of which, unlike stock appreciation, is received
by individuals in the lower income brackets, is about 12 per cent.18
14. IRC § 1014.
15. IRC §§ 1201(b), 1202.
16. In 1961 the net capital gain less loss from sales of capital assets reported as
adjusted gross income was $6.0 billion. U.S. TRrAsuRY DEPT.-INTERNAL REvENUE SEaviCE,
STATISTICS OF INCoME, 1961, INDIVIDUAL INcoMxE TAx 7, Table H. In 1960, the closest year
for which data is available, the comparable figure on taxable estate and fiduciary income
tax returns was $1.0 billion. US. TEASURY DEPT.-INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS
OF INcomE, 1960, FmucIARY AND EsrATE TAX RLruRas 3, Table A, 25, Table 8. About
60 per cent of the income reported by fiduciaries on taxable returns was rendered non-
taxable by the "distribution to beneficiaries deduction," so to avoid duplication the $1.0
billion should be reduced to $0.4 billion. Id. at 10-12, Table 2. Only half of capital gains
reported on individual returns are includable in adjusted gross income (IRC § 1202) so
the -total is $6.0 times 2 plus $0.4, or $12.4 billion. About half or less of this derives
from sales of corporate stock. U.S. TREASuRY Dm.r.-INmNPAL REvENuE SERvzcE, STATiSmTcs
OF INCOim, 1959, SALES OF CArrAL Ass-rs 10, Table 2 [hereinafter cited as STATrtscs oF
INCOME, 1959, SALES OF CAPrrAL AssErS] (including a portion of the item "share of gain
or loss from partnerships or fiduciariesT). So the stock-derived capital gains reported
was probably about $6.2 billion. Stocks in the hands of individuals and nonprofit institu-
tions in 1961 appreciated about $100 billion. See SEC Release No. 202 (April 7, 1965).
But because 1961 was an atypically high year, the average yearly appreciation from
1950 to 1964 will be used instead. It was $42.5 billion. (The value of such stock at the
end of 1960 was $379.3 billion. Id. The average yearly appreciation was 11.2 per cent.
Standard and Poor's Index, cited in U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsUS, 1965 STATtICmAL AusTnAcr
OF THE UNITrr STAi-'s 473, Table 647 [hereinafter cited as STATISTIC,,L AsRcr]). Non-
profit institutions hold about 5 per cent as many stocks as do individuals. NEW YoaX
STOCK EXCHANGE FACT Book 1965 [hereinafter cited as NYSE FACT BooK 1965]. $42.5 billion
less 5 per cent is about $40 billion. The fraction reported in 1961 m.as therefore about
15.5 per cent, that is, $6.2 billion out of $40 billion. This method of computation yields
approximately the same result no matter what year is chosen.
See M. Bailey, Capital Gains and Income Taxation, 1963, pp. 8-11 (unpublished,
available at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.). Bailey concluded that from
1926 to 1961 the ratio of reported capital gains on corporate stock to capital gains
actually accruing was about 10 per cent. His method is essentially the same as mine,
but much more statistically precise.
17. IRC §§ 1201(b), 1202.
18. Total adjusted gross income from all sources in 1962 was $348.7 billion. U.S.
TREAsuRy DEir.-Ir-ENAL REVENUE SERvIcE, STATSTICS OF INCo.tE, 1962, INDIVIMUAL IN-
corm TAX RxruRxs 33 9- Table 1 [hereinafter cited as 1962 INDIVMUAL INCOME TAX RE-
Trams]. $5.8 billion of that was from sales of capital assets. Id. at 38 & Table 4. Total tax
liability was $44.9 billion. Id. at 33 & Table 1. The 5.8 billion of sales of capital assets
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The concern of this article, however, is only with the appreciation
of the stock of large corporations with widely held stock-so-called
"public corporations." To determine the revenue loss represented by
the failure to tax this appreciation as ordinary income, we shall first
estimate the average annual amount of such appreciation; second,
estimate the distribution of the appreciating stock among taxpayers in
various ordinary-income rate brackets; third, calculate the tax which
that amount of annual appreciation would pay if it were realized as
ordinary income; and fourth, subtract the amount of tax that it is
already paying.
Annual Appreciation
The value of all individually held corporate stocks at the close of
1964 was slightly less than $600 billion.' 9 They account for about a
third of all individually owned wealth" and about half of the capital
gains reported on individual and fiduciary income tax returns. 2' The
value of the stock of public corporations alone at the close of 1964
was about $478 billion.22 From 1950 through 1964 prices of publicly
held stocks rose an average of 11 per cent per year, compounded 3
could not have accounted for more than $2.9 billion of the tax. IRG §§ 1201(b), 1202.
The effective rate on ordinary income is thus at least $44.9 billion less $2.9 billion divided
by $348.7 billion less $5.8 billion, or 12 per cent.
19. SEC Release No. 2042 (April 7, 1965), Table 2 (total of corporate stocks plus
81 per cent of investment company shares). Investment company portfolios contain about
81 per cent common stocks. A STuo OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 119, 129 (1962). About 5 per cent has been subtracted for securities held by
nonprofit institutions. See NYSE FACr BOOK 1965 at 25.
20. First National City Bank of New York, Monthly Economic Letter, July 1964, at 78.
21. STATISTICS OF INCOME, 1959, SALES OF CAPITAL AssETs 10 & Table 2 (including an
indeterminate portion of the item, "share of gain or loss from partnerships and fiduci-
aries').
22. (i) At the end of 1964 individuals held about $400.2 billion of the common
stocks of American companies listed in the New York Stock Exchange. NYSE FAcr Boott
1965, at 25, 36 (including holdings of common trust funds and investment companies).
(ii) Institutions other than common trust funds and investment companies held about
13.9 per cent of the stocks listed on the NYSE. Id. The stocks listed on the NYSE as of
1962 constitute about 92.5 per cent (in value) of all listed stocks. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY
OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.,R. Doe. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 27 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]. Assuming that
the same per cent of all listed stocks are held by individuals as are those listed on the
NYSE, this gives another $33 billion of listed stocks not on the NYSE that are held by
individuals.
(iii) The value of over-the-counter stocks is something "less than one-third" of those
listed. SPECIAL STUDY pt. I, at 14. We will use the figure 25 per cent to be conservative.
About 41 per cent of such stocks represent companies with assets of at least $3 million
and with 500 or more shareholders. Id. at 27. We will assume that such companies, at
least, are "public." See text accompanying note 120. Again assuming that the per cent
held by institutions on the NYSE holds approximately true throughout, we have ($400.2
plus $33) times 25 per cent times 41 per cent or about $45 billion of unlisted public-
corporation stocks held by individuals. The grand total is then $478 billion.
23. During that period the average value of an NYSE-listed common stock increased
379.2 per cent. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 473 & Table 647 (stock prices, 1950 lo 1964);
STANDARD AND POOR'S CORPORATION, TRADE AND SECURITIES, STATIsTICS: CURRENT STATIsTICs
COMBINED wrr- BASIC STATISTIcs 69 (January 1966) (stock prices, 1965). On a compounded-
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However, during that period stocks underwent a revaluation, being
valued substantially higher relative to earnings and book value at the
end of the period than at its beginning, so 11 per cent represents
somewhat too high a figure for predicting future growth. From 1950
through 1964 (data for 1965 is not yet available) the average book
value per share of publicly traded stocks increased about 6Y. per cent
per year.2- That rate, on the other hand, probably represents too low
a figure for predicting future growth. The argument over the inten-
tional use of federal deficits to promote full employment and rapid
growth was not resolved in the affirmative until about 1964. The
amount of stimulus which the economy can safely tolerate is still under
dispute, but the principle of federal fiscal intervention now seems too
solidly established ever to permit a recurrence of the long periods of
recession and sluggish advance that characterized the fifties and early
sixties. So it can reasonably be predicted that the long range rate of
growth of publicly traded stocks will be better than 6Y per cent, less
than 11 per cent, and probably closer to the lower figure. Applying
these long range averages to 1965 stock values yields an amount of
public stock appreciation for that year of from S31 billion to $53
billion.25
Distribution Among Taxpayers
Five years ago, Robert J. Lampman, working under the sponsorship
of the National Bureau of Economic Research, published his study of
annually basis, that equals 11 per cent per year. Stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange account for about 80 per cent of all publicly traded stocks. See note 22 supra.
However, the other 55 per cent probably appreciated more rapidly than those listed
on the New York Stock Exchange and so using the 11 per cent figure is conservative.
Values for all stocks are not available back to 1950, so a more recent period must be
used for comparing the rates of growth. From 1960 to 1964 the Standard and Poor's
"Standard 500" Index increased from 55.85 to 81.37, or about 46 per cent. SrxATmr'.L
ABsmACr 473 & Table 647. That index covers about 85 per cent in value of all stocks
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, so it is fully representative of them. Letter to
author from Research Department, Standard and Poor's Corporation, July 23, 1965.
During the same four-year period individually held common and preferred stocks, listed
and unlisted, appreciated about 58 per cent. SEC Release No. 2042, Tables 1, 2 (April 7,
1965). Thus, since the total of all stocks appreciated more than those listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, those not listed on the Exchange must have appreciated much
more than those that were.
24. STANDARD AND POOR'S CORPORATION, TRADE AND SEcumrS, STATTIcs, Cunmrr
STATISTICS 31 (August 1966) (industrials). Data for industrials had to be used because
the more comprehensive "Standard 500" data is available only through 1962. But the
rates of growth shown by the two sets of data are almost identical, so the use of in-
dustrials introduces no significant error. Compare STANDARD AND POOr'S COnrOrATION.
TRADE AND SEcuRrrms, SrATncs, 1964 SEcuarry PRICE INDEX REcoRD 124 C'Standard 500"
book values through 1962).
25. Eleven per cent of $478 billion is $52.58 billion, and 6! per cent of $478 billion
is $31.07 billion. The actual appreciation of public stocks during 1965 was about $40
billion. STANDARD A'.N POOR's CORPORATION, TRADE AND SECURITIS, STATISTICs, CunnEr
STATISTIcs 31 (August 1966).
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the distribution of national wealth as revealed in estate-tax data from
1928 to 1953.2 6 He concluded that 82 per cent of the individually
owned corporate stock was held by or for the richest one per cent of
the families in the population, and counting only adults, by or for the
richest 1.6 per cent,2 7 and that this distribution had held steady over a
twenty-five year period.28
Professors Butters, Thompson and Bollinger of the Harvard School
of Business Administration in a 1952 survey using a confidential inter-
view technique, found a concentration that in some ways was even
more striking: 29 65 to 70 per cent of all individually owned market-
able30 stock was held by "spending units" with a net worth of more
than $250,000.31 The authors concluded that at the time of their sur-
vey, only a "small fraction of one per cent" of the population had this
net worth.32 They concluded further that 35 per cent of such stock was
held by spending units with income in excess of $50,000 (then about
one tenth of one per cent of the population) and 75 per cent by
spending units with incomes over $10,000 (then about 3 per cent of
the population).33 And in their opinion this data substantially under-
stated the true concentration. 34
There is good evidence that a larger proportion of all corporate
stocks are held by institutions such as charitable foundations and
pension trusts today than in the early 1950's.35 But there is no evidence
that the proportion that still remains in the hands of individuals is
any less concentrated in the hands of the wealthiest. Certainly, in the
light of Lampman's conclusion that the concentration did not change
materially from 1922 to 1953 36-a period spanning a series of major
economic disruptions and the imposition of very high corporate and
individual income taxes-it is reasonable to conclude, in the absence
26. R. LAMPMAN, THE SHARE OF Top WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH, 1922-56
(1962).
27. Id. at 191, 195.
28. Id. at 208.
29. BUTrERS, THOMPSON & BOLLINGER, .FFETs OF TAXATION, INVESTMENTS BY INDIVIDUAIS
(1953).
30. That is, stock that can be purchased by the public. Id. at 373.
31. Id. at 596, 399.
32. Id. at 399.
33. Id. at 440.
34. Id. at 393-96.
35. See NYSE FAcT BOOK 1965 25. The portion of NYSE-listed stocks held by institu.
tions has grown from 12.7 per cent in 1949 to 20.4 per cent in 1964. If investment
companies are eliminated from the category of institutions, on the grounds that they are
purely holding companies for their own shareholders, the respective portions are 8.7
per cent and 14.4 per cent. The percentage of stocks held by institutions fell slightly in
1965, however. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1966, at 13, col. 2.
36. LAreArAN, supra note 26, at 209; BuTrE s, THOMPSON & BOLLINGER, supra note 29,
at 397 ('no great change" apparent during three-year course of their study).
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of any evidence to the contrary, that the distribution remains approxi-
mately the same.
The comprehensive statistical analysis of individual income tax re-
turns published by the Internal Revenue Service for the year 19623T
discloses that tax returns reporting adjusted gross income of $20,000
or more comprise 1.7 per cent of the total.38 Since Lampman found
that the 1.6 per cent of the adult population holding 82 per cent of the
stock was also the wealthiest 1.6 per cent in other respectsp and since
personal wealth is by far the most important source of income of in-
dividuals in the highest brackets,40 it is a fair approximation to con-
clude that this 1.6 per cent coincides with the 1.7 per cent of the tax-
paying public reporting $20,000 or more income.4' The accuracy of
the approximation is further confirmed by the Butters, Thomson and
Bollinger data,- and a study made in 1959 by the Internal Revenue
Service.43 An estimate of how the 82 per cent of the stock is distributed
among the income levels above $20,000 can be obtained from the same
Internal Revenue Service study, which also shows the distribution
among various income levels of the amount of capital gains reported.4"
Estimate of the Tax Loss
On these assumptions the $31 to $53 billion of public stock apprecia-
tion45 would have incurred a tax liability between $16 and $27 billion
37. 1962 INDiVIDUAL INCOhm TAX R1rrTRNs was the most recent aailable data when this
article was written.
38. Id., pt. I at 38, Table 4.
39. I._AmPmAN, supra note 26, at 191, 195.
40. 1962 INDrvmuAL Ircoirm TAx Rrruaxs pt. I, at 38-40, Table 4.
41. In any event the accuracy of the approximation is not critical. If it is assumed
even that the 82 per cent of the stock held by or for the richest 1.6 per cent of the adult
population is spread out among the 11 per cent of individuals reporting the highest
incomes (those reporting incomes of $10,000 or more), the estimated revenue loss from
the failure to report appreciation of public stock as ordinary income amounts to only
about a fifth less than if the approximation stated in the text is used.
42. BtrrrRs, THOMPSON & BOLUNGER, supra note 29, at 393-97. Their data shous a very
high concentration of corporate stock among those with the highest incomes--though
because their computations were carried out in "spending units" rather than individuals
and because they admitted that their results substantially understated the true concentra-
tion, their data cannot be used directly for our purposes.
43. See STATICSia OF INCOME, 1959, SALES Or CAPrrAL Assm 33, Table 3. This study
showed a strikingly high concentration of reported capital gains from sales of corporate
stock by members of the highest income brackets.
44. Id. at 36, Table 3, col. 10. No breakdown for capital gains from corporate stock
alone for adjusted gross income levels of $20,000 and above is available, but the distribu-
tion of all capital gains probably does not differ materially from the distribution of such
gains from corporate stock alone in the highest brackets. The distribution of the two
quantities can be compared in STATISTICs or INCom, 1959. SALrs oF CArrrAL Assr 11.
Table 3. The distributions are seen to be very similar in the brackets above $50,000, but
corporate-stock capital gain is much less common than other kinds belowv the $50,000
bracket.
45. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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if it had been taxed as ordinary income at the 1965 rates applicable to
married couples filing joint returns. The rate tables applicable to
married couples filing joint returns are the lowest of the several pro-
vided by the Internal Revenue Code.46 Since this same appreciation in
fact incurred a tax liability of only about $1 billion,47 the revenue loss
was approximately $15 to $26 billion. In 1965 the total revenue from
the entire individual income tax was about $48.8 billion.48
The estimated revenue loss thus obtained is almost certainly too
low. Approximations were intentionally conservative.40 But even a
46. See IRC, § 1.
47. The total reported adjusted gross income derived from sales of capital assets was
$5.8 billion. 1962 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 36, Table 3. Less than half of that
derived from corporate stock. See note 21 supra. Only about 80% of that half derived
from publicly traded corporate stock. See text accompanying notes 19-23, supra. So only
$2.3 billion of reported adjusted gross income derived from sales of publicly traded stock.
That means that $4.6 billion of appreciation of such stock was reported, because only
half of that which is reported is includible in adjusted gross income. IRC § 1202. The
maximum tax rate on that reported is 25 per cent. IRC § 1201(b), § 1202. Twenty-five
per cent of $4.6 billion is $1.15 billion.
48. THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDINO
JUNE 30, 1967, at 55.
49. The "exclusion plus deduction" effect of charitable gifts of appreciated property
was ignored. Such gifts not only fail to count as a realization for tax purposes of accrued
appreciation, but are deductible to the full extent of their appreciated value against other
income. Elsie Sorelle, 22 T.C. 459 (1954); Rev. Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 GUM. BULL. 520 (gift
of appreciated property is not income to the donor); IRO § 170, Treas. Reg. § 1.170.1(c)
(1966) (amount of deduction for gift of property to charity is market value of property
at time of gift). The estimate took account of the exclusion of accrued appreciation on
such gifts but not its deductibility. Certain underlying assumptions in the computation
also tended to understate the amount of revenue loss. First, it was assumed that the
corporate-stock appreciation received by taxpayers in different tax brackets is proportion.
ate to the value of the stock they hold. In fact, wealthier people are probably motivated
to purchase stocks that have high potential for growth but relatively low dividends In
order to escape the high ordinary-income tax rates that apply to dividends. Individuals
in the higher tax brackets therefore benefit from proportionately more appreciation than
the value of their stock holdings indicates.
Second, the distribution of the 82 per cent of the stock held by those with adjusted
gross incomes of $20,000 or more ("the wealthiest 1.6 per cent') was assumed to be propor-
tionate to the amount of capital gains from sales of corporate stock reported on individual
income tax returns. Yet most capital appreciation from corporate stock-more than four-
fifths of it (see text accompanying note 16 supra)-goes unreported. The principal reason
must be that stock is either not sold at all or sold only after its tax basis was raised by
the death of the person holding the shares. The very rich must account for much more
than their proportionate share of such unreported appreciation because only they can
commonly afford to live on dividends or other income alone and to pass on their stock
to their descendants instead of selling it. The 1959 study on capital gains, STATISTICS OF
INCOME, 1959, SALrS OF CAPITAL ASSETS, contains an item supporting this conclusion, The
average price at which a share of stock was sold by the wealthiest category that reported
capital gains income (those with adjusted gross income of $1 million or more) was almost
five times the price at which it was purchased, or the value at which it was inherited,
whichever initial value applied. STATISTICS OF INCOME, 1959, SALrS OF CAPITAL AssETS 11,
Table 3. For those with incomes of about $10,000, on the other hand, the average share
of stock had appreciated only by 1/ its initial value before it was sold, Id. Stock that had
appreciated by a factor of five is likely to have been held much longer than stock that
appreciated only by a factor of 113. It seems clear that families in which stock is charac-
teristically held for much longer periods without being sold are also families in which
stock is much more likely to have been held until the owner dies.
The necessity of resorting so frequently to conservative, approximations and assumptions
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revenue loss of from $15 to $26 billion is serious enough. Since the
loss occurs almost entirely in the highest brackets, it also contributes a
severe regressive factor that eliminates most progression at all levels
and introduces a sharp regression above $25,000. Counting as income
the average annual stock appreciation since 1950, the effective tax rate
in 1962 was 8 per cent on incomes over $1,000,000; 12V., per cent on
incomes between $100,000 and $1,000,000; and 15V2 per cent on in-
comes between $20,000 and $25,000.10 These calculations take into
account only the effect of failing to tax public stock appreciation. An
even more strongly regressive pattern would reveal itself if other
factors were taken into account, for example, depletion allowances.
If the available data permitted an accurate separation of investors
from earned-income recipients at the same income level, it would un-
doubtedly show the wealthy corporate investors virtually riding free
when compared to other taxpayers. The regression above $25,000 is
apparent even from data that fails to differentiate the incomes of large
investors from those of doctors, engineers, executives and others whose
earnings over $25,000 are subject to the full progressive rates. Al-
points up the difficulty of making reliable estimates of the distribution of capital apprc-
ciaton when the only accessible data are income-tax data. The fact is, wealth in the
United States is immensely more concentrated than income. Some indication of how much
more is that in 1959 the four one-hundredths of one per cent of the tax returns reporting
the highest incomes accounted for 1.6 per cent of the total income, U.S. TmAsuny Dra'r.-
INTERNAL REVENUE SERvIcE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, 1959, INDIVmuAL LcoNmn TAx Ra-ruaxs
24, Table 1 [hereinafter cited as 1959 INDIVIDUAL INCO.tE TAx RErms] whereas the same
small fraction reporting the most capital gains from sales of corporate stock accounted
for over 50 per cent of the total of such gains.
50. Individuals held directly or through investment companies and common trust
funds about $478 billion of public-corporation stocks at the end of 19M. See note 22
supra. The average rate of appreciation of such stocks from 1950 to that time was 11.2
per cent. Authorities cited note 24 supra. Their appreciation during 1962 can therefore
be taken as about $39 billion. At least 82 per cent of such appreciation was probably
accounted for by stocks held by individuals reporting adjusted gross incomes of $20,000
or more. See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra. Eighty-two per cent of $39 billion is
$32 billion. No more than 20 per cent of the $32 billion was reported. See text accompany-
ing note 16 supra. Only half of that which is reported is includible in adjusted gross
income. IRC § 1202. So the adjusted gross incomes of those with adjusted gross incomes
of $20,000 or more fail to show about $28.8 billion (90 per cent of $32 billion) of apprecia-
tion on public-corporation stocks held by the individuals reporting such incomes. The
percentages in the text are obtained by assuming that the $28.8 billion is distributed
among -the -brackets above $20,000 in proportion to the amount of net gain Ies net loss
from sales of capital assets reported by each such bracket as shown in 1962 INDivIDUAL
INcomE TAx RrruwNs 36, Table 3, and that the actual tax paid by each bracket and the
adjusted gross income reported by each bracket are as shown in id. at 33-34, Table 1. The
rate for the $5000-$6000 bracket is taken directly from id. at 33-34, Table 1, without regard
for the negligible amount of unreported public-corporation stock appreciation accruing
to that bracket.
Since the foregoing computation used averages of public-stock appreciation taken from
a 14-year period and since the relative amounts of gains and losses from sales of capital
assets and of adjusted gross income among different brackets do vary widely from year
to year, the results of the computation are not dependent upon the use of the year 1962.
They would have been approximately the same no matter what year was used.
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though the tax liability on $22,500 of ordinary income in 1962 was
39 per cent for a separate return and 28 per cent for a joint return,
the average rate actually paid on this income was 15 per cent. The gap
in tax receipts is largely accounted for by the favored treatment of
investment income which begins to become a prominent income source
in this bracket. The effective tax rate for higher income levels is even
smaller.Y' The fact that the investor is fully taxed on his dividends
changes the picture very little. From 1960 to 1964, New York Stock
Exchange common stocks appreciated more than $140 billion 2 while
paying dividends of only $47 billion, 3 and the wealthy investor with
his "growth stocks" probably obtains an even higher appreciation-to-
dividends ratio than the average.
Both the loss of revenue and the injustice to earned-income re-
cipients will probably grow worse, because the relative importance of
stock appreciation to other forms of income is increasing. The wealth
represented by publicly held stocks has grown about a third more than
the economy as a whole since 1950. From 1950 to 1964 the total book
value of common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange in-
creased about 168 per cent.5 4 The sample is representative: New York
Stock Exchange stocks account for about 70 per cent of the value of all
marketable stocks in the country, both listed and over-the-counter,55 and
their rate of growth is probably slightly less than that of the other 30 per
cent. 56 Over the same fourteen years the gross national product in-
creased only 119 per cent.57 And since the wealth represented by gross
51. 1962 INnvmUAL INcoME TAx RETURNS 188.
52. The figure is obtained by multiplying the average value of such stocks during
1960, see NYSE FACT BOOK 1965, by the Standard and Poor's price-index change from 1960
to 1964, see STATISTICAL ABsrCT 478, Table 647. The figure is conservative because It
ignores the appreciation attributable to shares that obtained listing privileges after 1960
whereas it includes their dividends.
53. NYSE FACT BOOK 1965, at 47.
54. Average book value increased 144 per cent. See note 24 supra. The approximate
growth of total book value is derived by assuming that it bore the same relation to growth
of average book value as the growth of total market value bore to the growth of average
market value. The ratio of the latter two growth rates for 1950 to 196- was 1,17. Compare
the growth of average market prices, Standard and Poor's Stock Price Index, summarized,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 473, Table 647, with the growth in total market price of all NYSE-
listed stocks, NYSE FACT BOOK 1965, at 36. One and seventeen-hundredths times the
growth of average book value, which was 144 per cent, is 168 per cent.
55. The stocks listed on the NYSE constitute about 92.5 per cent (in value) of all listed
stocks. SPECIAL STUDY pt. I, at 27. Over-the-counter stocks equal something "less than one-
third" of listed stocks. Id., pt. I, at 14.
56. From 1960 to 1964 all corporate stocks held by individuals and nonprofit institu-
dons appreciated at the rate of 12.08 per cent per year. SEC Release No. 2042 (April 7,
1965). During the same period the Standard and Poor's representative index of stocks
listed on the NYSE rose at the average rate of 9.9 per cent per year. STATISrICAL ASmRAar
473, Table 647.
57. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 324, Table 444.
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national product includes the wealth represented by publicly held
stock, it can be estimated that the wealth represented by such stock has
grown about twice as much as other forms of individual and institu-
tional wealth since 1950.1; The value of New York Stock Exchange
stocks is substantially higher relative to the gross national product and
the national income now than at any other time in our history, includ-
ing the peak of the stock market boom in 1929.0
Those who write the federal tax laws have showm little enthusiasm
for dosing the gap between the shareholders' burden and the wage and
salary-earners'. President Kennedy's 1963 Special Message to Congress
on Tax Reduction and Reform proposed that the tax rates applicable
to capital gain be reduced even further but also that capital assets be
valued as of the date of the owner's death and appreciation up to that
time be deemed "realized" and taxed.0 The proposal would have sub-
stantially increased the revenue from capital gains tax on corporate
stock,61 but it never came close to enactment. The only significant
new tax-connected proposal that has become law in recent years, the
Medicare62-Old Age and Survivor's Insurancea package, will be fi-
nanced in part by an increase in the Social Security tax and in part
by funds from the general revenues. The increase in the Social Security
tax will be sharply regressive, burdening all earned income from $0
up to $6600, taxing no income at all in excess of that amount, and
applying only to wages and salaries. Not only will all profits of capital
appreciation escape the tax, but so will the dividends, interest, and
rents that are derived from investments. 4 A tax better fashioned to
aggravate existing inequities is hard to imagine.0 5
58. The figures on gross national product and national income do not include a cate-
gory for stock appreciation, so the comparison suggested in the text can only be rough. Id.
59. At the end of 1964, the value of stocks listed in the NYSE stood at $622.6, $509.8
(STATIsTICAL ABsTRAcT 324, Table 444) and $474.3 billion (NYSE FACT BOor 1965, at 36)
respectively, compared to $104.4, $87.8 (SrATIMcAL AnsmAcr 324, Table 444) and $64.7
billion (NYSE FACT Boor 1965, at 56) in 1929. The total value of all stocks, listed or not
listed, is now more than $600 billion (see note 19 supra).
60. PUBLIC PAPERs oF THE Prsm,,NTs oF THE UNrrED STATES, JOHN F. Ki "v 1963,
Special Message to Congress on Tax Reduction and Reform, Jan. 24, 1963, at 73, 89-90.
61. See text accompanying notes 16 and 45-48 supra.
62. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1964).
63. Social Security Amendments of 1965, 79 Stat. 286.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 411(2)-11(3) (1964).
65. Its founders did not intend the Social Security tax to be as egregiously regressive
as postwar Administrations and Congresses have allowed it to become. When enacted in
1937 the tax applied to wages and salaries up to $3,000 per Year. STATSTCAL A ,rnACT
294, Table 403. The median wage or salary income for white employees in 1939 (the closest
year for which this figure is available) was $1,112. HsTOrCAL STATLSTCS 168, Ser. G 169-190.
In 1962 it was $5,462. Id.; CONTINUATION AND REVISIoNS 25, Ser. G 169. A combined white-
nonwhite figure is not given. The data for nonwhite shows that if it were, the propor-
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Yet it is difficult to blame the Johnson Administration for choosing
it. Current thinking on tax policy practically compels such a choice.
Investments are considered sacrosanct, and what non-investment in-
come remains to be taxed is almost all in the lower brackets. Ordinary
earned income among the prosperous is already subject to very high
rates-taxable income above $20,000 enters the 48 per cent bracket
with the rate rising eventually to 70 per cent.66 High salaries cannot be
milked much further without making the tax virtually confiscatory and
even a confiscatory tax would not materially increase revenues. If all
taxable income above $26,000 had been taken away in taxes in 1963, for
example, the additional revenue would have amounted only to $717
million,67 less than one per cent of federal spending for that year.08
Medicare alone will cost about four times that amount. 09 Since their
preconceptions impelled them to look only to earned income, President
Johnson's advisers were forced to look primarily to those whose earned
incomes are small.
The prognosis is therefore that if government spending rises to meet
growing needs, the wage and salary earner will have to carry the
burden. Increasingly the acquisition or inheritance of investment
property will become the only road to substantial personal wealth. The
effect can only be to turn wealth-motivated talent away from executive,
technical and professional occupations and toward positions that offer
an opportunity to acquire and manipulate investments for personal
gain.
Conversely, if government expenditures fail to rise to meet public
needs, it may well be because wage and salary earners will balk at the
sacrifice. Their resistance can be expected to stiffen as the comparative
affluence of the propertied classes becomes more obvious. If taxes are
to meet the growing needs of the nation without becoming a grossly
disproportionate burden on wage and salary earners, they must bear
more heavily on incomes derived from investments.
tionate growth would be even greater than that shown by the white-only data. Id. If the
maximum salary or wage to which the tax was applicable bore the same relation to the
median salary or wage now as it did in the late 1930's, the tax would now apply to wales
and salaries up to $14,740. In fact, it was only recently raised to S6,600. See authorit es
cited notes 62-63 supra.
66. IRC § 1.
67. TAx FOUNDATION, INC., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 108, Table 84
(13th ed. 1964-65).
68. Federal expenditures in 1963 were $92.6 billion. STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr 892, Table 526.
69. 1965 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEws 2227.
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II. Adapting the Income Tax to the Situation of the Public Share-
holder
A. Publicly Held Stock
1. Shareholder Control
Tax equity, however, is not the only consideration. The tax privi-
leges of share ownership have traditionally been supported by the fear
that heavier taxes would deter risk-taking, reduce investment and thus
slow the rate of expansion of the entire economy °0 To judge whether
any such results would follow from a heavier tax on the appreciation
of publicly held stock, one must examine the characteristics of such
stock and the corporations that issue it.
Most publicly traded stock represents ownership in a very large
company. Although there are over a million active taxpaying corpora-
tions,71 fewer than two hundred report a third of all corporate profits.1
The largest five thousand account for about 70 per cent of the corporate
economy by almost any measure one cares to use. "3 Nearly all of these
large companies have thousands74 (in one case, millions3 ) of share-
holders. The stock of companies with many shareholders is traded
either on the New York Stock Exchange, whicl alone handles 70 per
cent in dollar value of all the publicly traded shares in the country,70
or on one of the lesser national or over-the-counter exchanges.
These conditions serve to separate the ownership of public corpora-
dons from their control. Typically the shareholders are too numerous
and scattered and too briefly associated with the company to exert any
70. E.g., KENNEDY 89-90; H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sms. 29 (1942); H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1951); circular letter to customers of Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner and Beane, Feb. 23, 1951, quoted in SuRuEY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, CASES AND IATERIALS 715-16 (1955 ed.).
71. US. TREAsuRY DEPT.-INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, 1961-62,
UNITED STATES BusmEss TAX RETuRNs 176, Table 22, col. (1).
72. STATISTIcAL Aasmcr 498, Tables 684-685 (1963 figures).
73. STATISTICAL ABSTRACr 497, Table 683: In 1962 the 5222 largest-those with asets
of $25 million or more-accounted for more than 69 per cent of the total assets and 70 per
cent of the total profits. It is interesting to note that their share of sales was much lower-
only 45 per cent. Id. Undoubtedly the difference is accounted for by the higher degree
of vertical integration characteristic of the larger firms, i.e., they do more to, and therefore
add more value to, their input before it is sold as output, as is evidenced by their much
higher rate of profit per dollar of sales. Id. at 500, Table 688.
74. There is a list of 125 firms with at least 50,000 shareholders in Standard and Poor's
publication, 37 THE OurLooK 609 (1965). More than twenty million individuals own stocks.
STATISmCAL ABsnRAcr 476, Table 652.
75. AT&T had 2,674,141 shareholders on December 31, 1964. STANDARD AND PoOR's
CORPORATION, CORPORATION DFscRIrxors 8919 (June-July 1965).
76. See note 55 supra.
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real influence on corporate policy. 7 The powers vested in them by
law have passed without a struggle to a professional class of executives
which claims for itself the exclusive power to manage.1 8 Public share-
holders still go through the motions of "electing" boards of directors,
but except in rare instances they have no alternative to the manage-
ment slate, which almost invariably wins.7 9
2. Use of the Equity Market
Among large, publicly held corporations only the regulated utilities
obtain a significant portion of their investment capital by issuing
stock. 0 Almost all the rest finance their expansion entirely from re-
tained earnings and depreciation charges and by borrowing. From
1947 through 1956, corporations other than utilities obtained only
about 1.25 per cent of their capital by issuing stock. The aggregate
figure including utilities was 5.7 per cent8l for the full ten year period
and in one recent year dropped as low as 1 per cent.8 2
Even these figures considerably overstate the use of the equity market
by public corporations, because they reflect new incorporations, which
must use stock and debt in reasonably balanced amounts8 3 and cannot
draw on depreciation or retained earnings. There is no precise break-
down for public corporations alone, but one indication of their re-
luctance to raise equity capital is the infrequency of new share offerings
for which holders of outstanding shares listed on the New York Stock
Exchange 4 obtained preferential subscription rights. Subscription
77. A. BERLE AND G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1-9,
84-90, 13841 (1937 ed.); A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 63-64, 73-74 (1959); G. MEANS,
THE CORPORATE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 158 (1962); see Manning, Book Review, 67
YALE L.J. 1477 (1958); J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958); Harbrecht, The
Modern Corporation Revisited, 64 COLUm. L. REV. 1410, 1413 (1964).
It is interesting to note that legally shareholders of public corporations usually seem
to have more power to control corporate policy than do shareholders of smaller, 'close"
corporations. In the latter it is precisely the potentially very real power of the shareholders,
who are few in number and typically personally interested in the corporation's affairs, that
necessitates the legal curbing of their power by devices such as voting trusts, shareholder
agreements, long-term management contracts and the like, devices that are usually not
necessary in publicly held corporations. See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 1.07, 1.12
(1958). Apparently the idea of shareholder democracy is not thought well of at any level
of business.
78. Id.
79. A. BERLE, supra note 77, at 104-06; LIVINGSTON, supra note 77, at 47-48, 151.65.
80. A. BERLE, supra note 77, at 40. For a discussion of the legal limits of utilities'
borrowing, see Cook & Cohn, Capital Structures of Electric Utilities Under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act, 45 VA. L. REV. 981 (1959).
81. U.S. DEPT. OF COMNMRCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESs 10, Table 2 (Sept. 1957).
82. STATISTICAL AasmRAcr 502, Table 693.
83. See, e.g., Colony, Inc., 26 T.C. 30 (1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1957), rcv'd on
other grounds, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
84. Holders of these shares account for more than 70 per cent of the value of all
publicly traded stock in the country. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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rights are a great convenience for public corporations entering the
equity market because they avoid the diffculties of setting a price for
new shares which will not unfairly dilute the value of outstanding
stock. Yet in 1964, not an atypical year, only eight of the 1,247 com-
panies listed on the exchange granted such rights, and seven of the
eight were utilities. The price of the offering of the single non-utility
was less than three thousandths of one per cent of the total value of the
shares then outstanding on the exchange.8s One of the other seven was
American Telephone and Telegraph, whose immense size and uniquely
absolute monopoly power render it a special case.8 Ignoring it, total
offerings pursuant to subscription rights for utilities as well as nonutil-
ities listed on the exchange were still only about four hundredths of
one per cent of the amount outstanding.8 7
It is not difficult to understand the preference for borrowing over
equity as a means for obtaining capital from external sources. Large
corporations can borrow at low interest rates. Interest payments on
loans 8 are tax deductible, while dividends are not. And because stocks
lack a "maturity date" upon which they will be redeemed for a fixed
sum, their prices fluctuate much more widely than the prices of bonds.
Stocks therefore are characteristically a riskier investment, especially
in the short run, and the shares of even the stablest corporation sell
for much less than its bonds, relative to after-tax earnings.
B. Effect on Investment
A tax may reduce investment in three general ways:
1. In an economy which is fully employed, funds may be diverted
away from private investment into private consumption or govern-
ment spending if a large share of the fiscal burden is imposed on tax-
payers with a high propensity to save.
2. By decreasing after-tax profits, the tax may reduce the incentive
to invest.
3. If tax liability is imposed only when an investment is liquidated
-as is the case, for example, with the present income tax on capital
gains-investors will be reluctant to liquidate one investment in order
to place their funds in another (the "lock-in" effect), and investment
generally may be discouraged.
85. The lone company was J. I. Case. NYSE FAcr BooK 1965, at 9, 16.
86. See note 181 infra.
87. NYSE FAar BOOK 1965, at 9, 16.
88. IRC § 163.
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1. Diversion of Investment Funds
When the economy is operating at less than full capacity, the volume
of investment is not likely to be reduced by shifting some of the tax
burden to the wealthy. In fact, a more progressive tax structure is likely
to be a positive inducement for businesses to invest, as it increases the
disposable income of less wealthy people, who characteristically have a
higher propensity to consume. But under conditions of full employ-
ment, the economy cannot have more real consumption unless it is
willing to accept less private investment or less government spending.
The attempt to raise consumption without compensating reductions
in the other two sectors leads to inflation-more money will be spent,
but higher prices will keep the real total of consumption, private invest-
ment and government purchases the same. Thus, increased taxation of
shareholders relative to other taxpayers might threaten business in-
vestment because most shares are held by the wealthy, whose high pro-
pensity to save in a fully employed economy permits resources to be
devoted to business investment and government spending. If an ap-
preciation tax were to shift disposable income from them to earned-
income recipients with a presumably greater inclination to consume,
private investment would necessarily be reduced, unless the govern-
ment abstained from an appropriate amount of its own spending.
But the effect on consumption of an appreciation tax may be con-
siderably less than the traditional high-income/high-savings doctrine
suggests, and the range of responses open to the government to offset
any increased consumption includes options other than reducing
private investment. Today there are important kinds of savings in our
economy which may even bear an inverse relation to personal wealth.
More than half of all net personal financial savings now take the form
of payments to pension trusts or insurance companies.80 It is a reason-
able guess that the amount of such payments would grow even faster
if more after-tax income were shifted to wage, salary and other earned-
income recipients. Savings by businesses (depreciation charges plus re-
tained earnings) are regularly two to three times as much as individual
savings.90 Businesses presumably would save more if individuals saved
less, because increased individual spending would add to business
receipts. Thus, the reduction in savings of the personal-accumulations
variety caused by the appreciation tax would be offset to some extent
by its enhancement of other kinds of savings.
89. 1966 EcoNoMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 229, Table C-17.
90. Id. at 230, Table C-18.
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Moreover, there are several ways in which the government could
avoid any drop in total savings and still increase the taxation of stock-
holders. The appreciation tax could be accompanied by a reduction in
the rates applicable to high-bracket ordinary income. Earned-income
recipients would then be placed on a par with public shareholders in
their ability to save, and the population's overall propensity to con-
sume kept the same. Or individuals in the lower brackets could be
encouraged or required to save more. For example, the Social Security
retirement system might be substantially expanded, private pension
plans offered more tax privileges and other stimuli, or consumer credit
(a form of negative savings) restricted. Alternatively, the government
could reduce private consumption by raising taxes or leave more room
for private investment by curtailing its own spending, i.e., reduce the
fiscal deficit. Even if the choice were to accept a reduction in private
investment rather than to reduce government spending or enhance
private savings, the resulting shift of investment emphasis toward the
public sector would be welcomed by the many economists who have
compared the marginal returns on private and public investment.0 '
2. Reduced Investment Incentive
The second possible objection is that the proposed tax would reduce
the incentive to invest. Here a distinction must be made between in-
vestment by a corporation and purchases of its shares. The incentive of
certain individuals and financial institutions to purchase outstanding
shares would indeed be reduced by a tax on the shares' appreciation.
But it has already been demonstrated that the purchase of outstanding
stock has no effect on a corporation, neither directly providing the
necessary funds to build or purchase new production facilities nor
adding to the ability of the corporation to build or buy them.02 The
only change would be in the price of a company's shares. This price is
sometimes alleged to affect a corporation's ability to borrow, 3 be-
cause lenders rely on the public's assessment of the corporation's fi-
nancial position. But if this effect exists at all, it is entirely relative to
the positions of other corporations. Thus, since the price-depressant
effect of a tax on appreciation would affect all public corporation stocks,
the varying values that the public placed on different stocks could still
be observed by any lender who cared to look.
91. See, e.g., Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. Pot
ECON. 297 (1959).
92. The necessary special treatment of newly issued shares is discused at pp. 46-47,
56-57, 62 infra.
93. Eg., Harbrecht, supra note 77, at 1419.
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But what of the tax's possible effect on management's incentive
to invest the funds of the public corporation? It might be thought
that in the interest of its shareholders, management would hesitate to
invest corporate funds because the increased value of the corporation's
stock ultimately resulting from successful investment would be taxed
as ordinary income. But shareholders will also be taxed at ordinary
rates if management decides not to invest the funds of the corporation
in new facilities, since profits paid out as dividends are taxed to the
recipient as ordinary income. Any tax effect on management's decision
would come close to a stand-off: shareholders would be taxed im-
mediately on distributed profits at the same rate that they would be
later taxed on reinvested profits.
But it might be argued that even something close to tax neutrality
would be a step backward, because shareholders naturally prefer
dividends even when corporate reinvestment would be more profit-
able, and the present very light taxation of appreciation relative to
dividends provides a necessary counterpressure to that preference. The
argument has several answers.
The preference is illogical, since dividends improvidently granted
reduce the value of shares by more than shareholders gain from receiv-
ing them. So as the portion of the market held by mutual funds, pen-
sion trusts and other institutional shareholders continues to grow, 4
diminishing the role of the less sophisticated small individual holder,96
the short-sighted dividend preference can be expected to decline.
More importantly, the proposed tax would probably actually reduce
whatever net effect the dividend preference may have, because, contrary
to widespread assumption, the privileges accorded to stock appreciation
by existing law probably strengthen the preference more than they off-
set it. Shareholders now incur a tax on appreciation only if they sell or
exchange their shares prior to death. They are thus provided a strong
incentive to retain shares as long as possible and to meet their current
cash needs entirely from dividends. But, as will be shown,10 the tax
privileges enjoyed by appreciation under existing law are also serving
to inflate stock prices to the point where dividends average only 3 to
4 per cent of price. It is not surprising that under these circumstances
some shareholders feel starved for cash and so prefer dividends to cor-
porate re-investment even though dividends incur a higher tax. Under
94. See authorities cited note 35 supra.
95. See SPECIAL STUDY pt. IV, at 140.
96. See NYSE Fact BooK 1965, at 47; and text accompanying notes 137-42 infra.
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the proposed tax system, shareholders would be in a much better cash
position. Since public stock appreciation would be taxed annually,
whether or not shares were sold, there would be no tax penalty on
raising cash by selling a few shares occasionally, and since such appre-
ciation would be taxed at the same rates and intervals as other forms
of income, stock prices would no longer be inflated and dividends
would probably average about 5 to 7 per cent of price.
Even if, contrary to expectation, the proposed tax were found to
have increased the effect of the dividend preference, the government
would not be powerless to restore the balance. The investment credit,
temporarily suspended last year to check inflation, could be reinstated
or expanded to stimulate corporate re-investment.
In any event, the argument that removing a tax pressure on share-
holders would tip the scales against corporate reinvestment miscon-
ceives the nature of the large corporate enterprise. The scales are too
heavily weighted in the other direction. The average return on in-
vestment realized by the larger corporations in the United States has
varied between 8.7 per cent and 13.3 per cent after taxes since 1950.11
That is considerably more than the average shareholder could earn on
his money by investing it at comparable risk elsewhere. When the
taxation of dividends is taken into account as well-the average divi-
dend dollar is taxed roughly forty cents'S--the disparity in potential
earning power between a dollar reinvested and a dollar distributed to
shareholders is on the order of three or four to one. Faced with such
odds in favor of re-investing, management would be acting wholly ir-
rationally if it turned down satisfactory reinvestment opportunities in
order to pay larger dividends. There is no better place in the entire
economy from which to invest large sums than inside the large corpora-
tions themselves. They possess the expertise, the facilities, and, most
important, the advantage of an established position in an industry or
industries, all of which makes it relatively easy to put money to work
at a profit.
Moreover, management could turn its back on these investment op-
portunities only at its peril. The alternative to growth is likely to be
97. EcoNo ucs DEPARTmNT, Fnts NATIONAL Cry BANK, NEW Yopu-, AT.RACE ANuAL
RATEs OF RETuRN. The average has been even higher for manufacturing corporations.
There, the high and low for the period, 1950-1964, were 17.1 per cent and 9.8 per cent. Id.
98. The median adjusted gross income level at which dividends are received is $'25,000-
$50,000. 1962 IrNInuAL INconE TAx Raruius 36, Table 3, col. 18. That level reported
an average taxable income of $26,000. Id. at 33, Table 1, cols. 1, 4. At that level an un-
married individual pays 50 per cent and a married individual 36 per cent. IRO § 1.
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decline, not merely stagnation. One reason is technology. Advanced
production techniques frequently produce goods more cheaply if, but
only if, they are produced in greater volume. Thus the only way for a
firm to stay as efficient as its rivals may be to expand along with them.
Even staying at the same level of output may require increasing in-
vestment. Labor-saving devices may cut costs, and therefore have to be
acquired for the firm to stay competitive, but require a much larger
investment than the machinery they replace. Personal motivations are
also at work. The path is shorter to high executive position in a grow-
ing company because growth makes room at the top. Growth furnishes
much of the excitement in business, and an executive's compensation,
reputation and personal sense of achievement, are closely related to
his role in helping his company grow.
While the maintenance of an adequate level of investment can never
be taken for granted, neither does it make sense to talk as though the
wolf of stagnation were always at the door. Investment incentive needs
watching but not constant nurture. Indeed, the government must oc-
casionally act to restrain the pressures toward increased corporate in-
vestment to prevent an inflationary spiral.99
3. "Locked-in" Investments
The proposed appreciation tax would eliminate the present system's
"lock-in" effect, the third way in which taxation of profits may discour-
age investments. Income tax liability now attaches to stock appreciation
only when shares are sold; investors may therefore hesitate to sell sub-
stantially appreciated shares even in order to re-invest their funds more
profitably elsewhere. Because appreciation would be taxed annually
under the proposed tax, whether or not shares were sold, investors
would have no tax incentive to hold on to their shares indefinitely.
The tax would thus ease the passages of funds back and forth between
the stock market and areas of investment which still rely upon indi-
vidually held capital, such as real estate and small business, and so
make a real contribution toward maintaining a proper balance of in-
vestment resources throughout the economy.
C. A Proposed System for Taxing Appreciation
Public stock appreciation could be taxed annually. The shareholder
would be taxed on the amount, if any, by which his stock increased in
99. See, e.g., Lippman, Regulating the Boom, Washington Post, March 17, 1966, section
A, at 21, cols. 1-3; Wall Street Journal, March 21, 1966, at 1, cols. 3-6; Wall Street Journal,
March 31, 1966, at 1, col. 6, and 12, cols. 4-6.
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value during the year, each year, for as long as he had it. If he sold it,
he would be taxed on the amount by which the sale price exceeded its
value for the previous year. A large amount of untaxed appreciation
thus would never be permitted to accrue, and there would be no tax-
imposed obstacle to selling the shares whenever a more attractive use
for the invested funds appeared.
The common argument against imposing a tax on the increased
value of an asset before it has been sold is the difficulty of assessing the
extent of the increase. The exchanges, however, eliminate this difficulty
for public stocks. A shareholder could not justly complain if in his
opinion the market was too low a measure of the value of his shares
for tax purposes, because the tax difference would be in his favor. He
could not justly complain that it was too high either, because (unless he
were a control shareholder, whose special problems will be discussed
below) he could sell the shares and, with no tax penalty for liquidating
his investment, make an extra profit on the market's apparent miscal-
culation.
Only those relatively few individuals or, more often, institutions,
that hold such large blocks of a single stock that they cannot sell any
large portion of it in a short time without depressing the market,
might reasonably complain that the market price was an unfairly high
measure of real value. Such unfairness should be minor. Every day
brokers and large-portfolio administrators manage the problem of dis-
posing of large blocks of stock at a price that is not very far below the
market.10 Even if it is assumed that the market would always exceed
by a few points the realizable value of a large block of stock, the over-
estimate of appreciation during the first year the shares were held
would be cancelled out when they were sold. Full freedom to average
gains and losses over successive tax years would insure this. The prob-
lem might also be attacked directly. The same factors making it diffi-
cult to dispose of a large block except at a few points below the market
might have been in operation when the block, or chunks of it, were
acquired. The holder who could show that he acquired a block at less
than the market price might be permitted to value it thereafter at the
amount below the market at which it was purchased, to avoid paying
tax on an artificially high measure of income the first year after the
100. The average turnover of mutual fund portfolios in 1965 was 19 per cent, compared
to only 16 per cent for all NYSE-listed stocks. Many funds were substantially higher than
even 19 per cent. Wall Street Journal, March 8, 1966, at 1, col. 6, and 28, coL 1.
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purchase. Such an exception to the otherwise uniform valuation rules
should be manageable if limited to very large blocks.
The relatively minor fluctuations of day-to-day trading could be
adjusted for tax purposes with an appropriate formula for defining
"'official tax value." The average of the daily closing prices for the
calendar year or perhaps for the last few months of the year might be
used, for example. Exact figures could readily be computed and pub-
lished by the Internal Revenue Service itself, or by the principal ex-
change on which the particular stock was traded. The officially com-
puted values could be published shortly after the close of the year in
leading newspapers, and supplied to brokers and banks.
For those public corporation stocks that are not listed on an ex-
change (in terms of dollar value, something less than 14 per cent of the
total)"'- the "bid" and "asked" quotations on the over-the-counter
markets-an informal collection of brokers and dealers throughout
the nation who buy and sell stocks not listed on an exchange"12-could
serve the same function as the daily closing prices on the exchanges.
Much of the uncertainty and roughness presently existing in the quo-
tations could be ironed out by computerizing the operation of the
market as an SEC special study recently recommended.10 3 But the
principal guarantee of a fair tax valuation for over-the-counter as well
as listed stocks would be the use of a long-term average rather than
any given daily quote; the value for tax purposes would thus never be
higher than a price at which the stock could actually have been sold
for substantial periods during the year.
Under some circumstances taxing stock appreciation annually would
force a shareholder to sell a part of his portfolio to pay the tax on the
whole. For example, in a good year during which the value of his shares
rose an average of 15 per cent and paid dividends of 3 per cent, a share-
holder in the 50 per cent bracket who was unwilling to borrow and had
no other source of cash would have to sell shares equal in value to 5.2
per cent of his holdings. He would be left with a portfolio equal to
109 per cent of its pre-rise value, free of all future tax claims. It is
immaterial that he might have preferred not to sell, even at an appre-
ciated price. Tax assessments limit everyone's ability to invest, and
there is nothing in the situation of the public shareholder to justify
101. The value of over-the-counter stocks is something "less than one-third" of those
listed. SPECIAL STUDY pt. I, at 14. About half in value of over-the-counter stocks are stocks
of corporations with 500 or more shareholders. Id. at 27.
102. SPECIAL STUDY pt. II, at 541.
103. Id. at 657, 669-70.
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giving him any special consideraton. And any supposed loss from
having to sell a part of his holdings to pay the tax on the rest in a
market that supposedly failed to reflect the shares' "true" worth, as will
be shown below, would have been offset, or more than offset, by his not
having to pay tax on the appreciation of their full value.
To permit those public corporations which needed equity financ-
ing to raise capital by issuing more shares,104 new shares might be
granted the privilege of taxation at the present low capital-gains rates
and only if they were sold or exchanged, for a substantial period after
their issuance. Capital-gains treatment for about fifteen years would
seem long enough to maintain the individual's (or financial institu-
tion's) incentive to make such an investment. Favorable tax treatment
for new issues would mean that they would temporarily command a
higher price than a corporation's previously outstanding stock of the
same class. But the additional complication thus injected into the
market would still be less than already exists with respect to bonds.
Several issues, or "series," of bonds are frequently outstanding from a
single issuer at one time, and the market has long since shown that it
can adapt to them. The certainty that the favorable capital gains treat-
ment would terminate in a set number of years would, of course, still
represent a slight deterrent to investors, compared to the present
promise of endless tax freedom. But the period of exemption from the
appreciation tax could be made long enough to minimize any deter-
rence. Moreover, when the great bulk of outstanding public stock was
being taxed annually at ordinary rates, newly issued shares carrying a
fifteen-year immunity would look very attractive by comparison and
probably would be more saleable than they are now. The proposed tax
on appreciation, therefore, if the government chose to couple it with
a sufficiently liberal exemption for newly issued shares, could even
serve to stimulate the issuance of new stock.
D. Special Problems of Control Stock
The discussion to this point has assumed that in a "public corpora-
tion" all stock is so widely dispersed that its owners are impotent to
control management. The assumption does not hold true for a rela-
tively few 0 5 large corporations. The Ford Motor Company is an
104. Whether shares issued under executive stock option plans should be deemed "new
issues" for this purpose is a question beyond the scope of this article. Such shares are issued
in order to compensate executives to an extent that the tax laws would othense not
permit rather than to raise capital.
105. It is difficult to establish how much stock is held by those who could, if the chips
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outstanding example. As of 1964, the public held 51.7 million shares of
its common stock, the Ford Foundation held 46.4 million shares of
nonvoting Class A common, and members of the Ford family and the
Edison Institute held all 12.5 million shares of the Glass B common,
which carried the privilege of electing a majority of the members of
the board of directors. 06 Since the Ford family holdings give control,
an argument could be constructed for exempting them from the
proposed tax. But the better procedure would be to tax controlling
shares the same as publicly held stock despite the admitted difference.
Treating them as an exception would constitute a substantial privilege
for a very few, very wealthy people and, as will be seen, an unnecessary
privilege as well.
If their stock were treated as public for tax purposes, the controlling
shareholders of a large corporation would have to choose among three
ways of meeting their increased tax liabilities: (i) taking more money
out of the corporation in the form of dividends, (ii) occasionally selling
some of their stock, thereby gradually diminishing their control, or
(iii) reducing their style of living. The second and third alternatives
would leave the corporation itself unaffected and so are the more de-
sirable for the good of the economy. The first would leave the corpora-
tion with less money to invest, and so would have a dampening effect
on business expansion. However, there is no situation in which a con-
trol group would find it advantageous to choose that alternative.
Control of a large corporation is almost always exercised through
ownership of much less than all of the outstanding profit-participating
stock. The Ford family, for example, exercises unquestioned control of
the Ford Motor Company by holding only 11 per cent of the partici-
pating common. 07 A group with only partial ownership would have
were down, really use it to control a large corporation. A 1949 study concluded that the
1 or 2 per cent of the "spending units" that held the most corporate stock held from 65
to 71 per cent of the total (the higher percentage includes beneficial interests in stock
held in trust) and that the average holding of the group was, conservatively, $305,000.
BurrEs, THOMPSON 8- BOLLINGER, supra note 29, at 380-82. $305,000 worth of stock, even
assuming that it is all in one company, is, of course, wholly inadequate to control a sizeable
public corporation. The makers of the survey were unable to obtain an accurate measure
of how many stockholders held portfolios valued at very much more than $305,000, or ofjust how much stock such stockholders held, even though they utilized what they thought
were very accurate procedures, and concluded from their failure that such "ultra wealthy"
stockholders must constitute a "very small" group. Id. at 388.
106. MOODY, INDUSTRIAL PRICE MANUAL 2794-98 (1964).
107. As of 1964 the Ford Motor Company had outstanding 51.7 million shares of
ordinary common stock, 46.4 million shares of Class A Common Stock and 12.5 million
shares of Class B Common Stock. All of the Class B Common was held by members of
the family or their affiliates and by the Edison Institute. All shares participate equally in
dividends and liquidation rights but only the ordinary common and the Class B Common
have voting rights, and the voting rights are such that the holders of the Class B Com-
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to match every extra dollar withdrawn in dividends for its own use
with another dollar, or more likely many others, for the noncontrolling
shareholders, and the resulting impairment of the corporation's earn-
ing power would be prohibitive. Even a group with near-total owner-
ship would be acting irrationally if it chose the first alternative over
the second in order to raise tax money. The second alternative would
likely be far more profitable (as discussed on p. 643 supra) and it would
not threaten the group's control because, by hypothesis, it would own
far more shares than were needed for that purpose.
A controlling shareholder or member of a controlling group who
felt compelled to sell some of his shares to raise tax money would
ordinarily have to sell them on the market and so would fail to receive
the additional value, or "premium," that control stock may com-
mand.108 It is by no means obvious that the tax laws should be con-
cerned to protect premiums. Their legality and social utility have been
questioned 10 9 But in any event the loss involved would be minimal or
nonexistent.
A quick calculation shows that so long as a shareholder's sales do not
reduce his holdings below what is necessary for control, any premium
lost on a sale is at least offset by the savings realized on not having to
pay tax on the appreciation of the premium on his entire holdings.110
However, the sale that crossed the control line might involve not just
the loss of the premium on the shares sold but the destruction of the
premium on those that were retained as well.
Professor William D. Andrews has recently examined in depth the
reasons why control stock may command a premium and which of
those reasons are legitimate.' He rejects any differential not based on
a benefit that, if realized, would accrue equally to all the corporation's
outstanding shares, on the grounds that any other kind of benefit
would be inconsistent with management's obligation to manage for
the uniform good of the company's stockholders."- The legitimate
mon are sure to control the board of directors. MOODY, INDUSTRIAL PRICE MANUAL 2797-98(1964).
108. See generally Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale
of Shares, 78 HAv. L. REv. 505 (1965).
109. See Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CA.w. L. REv. 1 (1956); L. Gov,s,
THE PRINCIPLEs OF MODERN CONIPANY LAw 494 (2d ed. 1957).
110. The tax liability would eclual the market value of the holdings times the percent-
age by which they appreciated times the applicable tax rate. At most, the shareholder
would be forced to sell that much in value of stock, so his maximum loss on the sale
would be that amount times the percentage of premium. On the other hand. since his
tax liability was based on market value and the value of his stock, by h)othesis, exceeded
that by the extent of the premium, his tax savings equalled the value of his holdings
times the percentage of the premium, times the percentage of appreciation times the
applicable tax rate-exactly the maximum amount he could have lost on the sale.
111. Andrews, supra note 108, at 522-27.
112. Id. at 524.
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bases for premiums he describes are: (i) the ability of the buyer of
control to put into effect his preferences in management policies or
personnel, (ii) the ability of the holder of control to protect himself
against unwanted changes in management or management policies
introduced by someone else who might be in control if he were not,
and (iii) the ability of the holder of control to watch for any de-
terioration of management capabilities and correct or replace the in-
cumbent management if it should occur.113
The first basis would be impaired by a reduction in the size of the
block only if a buyer of control would be more likely to pay a premium
for control stock than for other stock. But in fact, buyers of control
of public corporations, if they pay a premium at all, commonly offer
it to all shareholders. 114 Were they not to do so, they would risk liability
to the shareholders who were not offered a premium"0 and would
violate what is apparently most businessmen's sense of fairness.110 If the
shares being purchased were listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
they would also violate the rules of the exchange." 7 Under the cir-
cumstances, the possibility that a control block might receive an "ex-
clusive" premium not equally available to noncontrolling shares seems
neither substantial nor worthy of protection.
The second basis for a premium is in practice too small to be cap-
able of objective valuation in a publicly held corporation. The wrest-
113. Id. at 526-27.
114. The most common method of obtaining such control by buying stock is tile "tender
offer." Wall Street Journal, February 11, 1966, at 1, col. 6. FTC, RE'oRT ON CORPORATE
MERGERS AND ACQUIsmoNs 9, 85-88 (1955). See also LIVINGSTON, supra note 77, at 47-48
(attempts to take control by proxy fights are very infrequent). The maker of a tender
offer typically announces that he will pay a certain amount for all shares deposited with
his agent prior to a certain date, if at least a stated minimum number of shares are
deposited, and if more than that are deposited, to take a pro rata portion of each deposit.
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 21, 1966, at 1, col. 5, and 10, col. 1. See also NEW YoRK STOCK
EXCHANGE COMPANy MANUAL § A-10. Takeovers effected by acquiring assets or by merging,
of course, also distribute any premium involved among all shareholders equally.
115. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
see also Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1956); L. GOWER,
THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAw 494 (2d ed. 1957); Andrews, supra note 108, at
515-45; Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 1212 (1958).
116. See Jennings, supra note 109, at 18 n.18.
117. NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL § A-10 (Redemptions-Tender Offers)
at p. A-179 reads in part:
The Exchange believes it is important that all stockholders of a company be given
an opportunity to participate on equal terms in any offer made which may affect
the rights or benefits of such stockholders. This objective has been implemented by
the company's listing agreement with the Exchange. As an example, a company agrees
that it will not select any of its securities listed on the Exchange for redemption
otherwise than pro rata or by lot.
The same considerations apply when a company invites its stockholders or stock-
holders of another company to tender their shares for purchase .... It is important,




ing of control from an incumbent controlling group other than by
buying its stock (which was dealt with in connection with the first
basis for a premium) is such a rare event among public corporations
that a survey in the 1950's showed that the average large company
could not expect to experience even the attempt to do such a thing
more than once in 150 years,118 and such attempts are now even
rarer.?9
The third basis for a premium can also be ignored for our pur-
pose because it would survive the dissolution of the control block.
A controlling shareholder who saw that his piecemeal sales were di-
minishing the size of his block either would already have, or could
place, his appointees on the board of directors, and under the con-
ditions prevailing in a publicly held company nothing short of a
catastrophe or a premium offer to all shareholders could thereafter
dislodge them. Under all other circumstances the board would be self-
perpetuating, and control would continue long after the control block
had shrunk to noncontrol size. So taking into account all the possi-
bilities, there is no point at which the gradual sale of a control share-
holder's block would involve the uncompensated loss of a significant
legitimate premium.
E. Defining "Public Corporation Stock'"
Public corporations ought to be distinguished from other corpora-
tions for tax purposes simply by the number of shareholders: 500
would seem ample to assure the public character of the corporation.
This is the number set by the Securities Act Amendments of 1964 for
deciding which corporations must meet the proxy and reporting re-
quirements of the Act.120 The rationale of the "500 rule" is that the
stock is certain to be publicly traded when it has so many stockholders,
and the relationship between management and actual and potential
shareholders has become so distant that regulatory safeguards are
necessary to assure access to information about the company.12' (The
Securities and Exchange Commission found 300 to be the appropriate
number of shareholders' -22 but Congress chose the higher number.)
Similar reasoning supports use of the same number for defining a
public corporation in our sense. Taxation of stock appreciation also
118. IxvmGsroN, supra note 77, at 47-48; see also A. BrnLE, supra note 77, at 16-1-5.
119. Wrall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
120. § 3, 78 Stat. 567 (1964).
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rests on the existence of a market for public trading; and the dispersal
of ownership, which prevents easy access to information, also di-
minishes shareholder control, a significant factor in our analysis of the
public corporation.
The only other test which the Securities Act Amendments impose
for a "public corporation" is gross assets equal to or in excess of $1
million.123 Such a test would be convenient for weeding out companies
whose total appreciation probably would not produce enough revenue
to make it worthwhile to tax them. However, nothing in the logic of
taxing public corporation stock requires an assets test. 2 4
A second problem would be to avoid discouraging normal corporate
financial activity through the application of the tax. A closely held
corporation and its controlling shareholders might hesitate to make a
public offering either of newly issued shares or of the controlling share-
holders' stock. Shareholders of a closely held corporation might hesitate
to sell out to, or merge with, a larger corporation if the bargain re-
quired them to receive publicly traded shares in exchange. Or two or
more closely held corporations might hesitate to combine if the com-
bined number of their shareholders was sufficient to constitute a public
corporation. Of course, shares with a public market are substantially
more valuable-all other things being equal-because they have a
higher degree of liquidity. But in most cases, the advantages of high
liquidity would probably not be enough to offset the unfavorable tax
consequences of going public.
In order not to discourage the transition, shares might be exempted
from the appreciation tax for a substantial period, say fifteen or twenty
years, after they enter the category of publicly traded stock. The length
of the delay period would determine the impact of the tax on the de-
cision to go public: the longer the period, the smaller the effect on
price of the impending tax liability. A sufficiently long delay period
would reduce the impending tax's effect on price to the point where
it was outweighed by the increased value attributable to going public.
Fifteen or twenty years ought to suffice for such a result, since the
liability of virtually all other publicly traded shares to the appreciation
tax would render those with a temporary tax immunity especially
desirable. The deterrent to going public could also be reduced by
leaving sales of the shares during the grace period entirely free from
taxation, even at the capital gains rates that currently apply.
123. § 3(c), 78 Stat. 567 (1964).
124. In the opinion of the SEC, nothing in the logic of the securities laws required It
either. See SPECIAL STUDY pt. V, at 150-51.
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Transactions in the other direction would also have to be taken
into account. A relatively small number of persons might seek to buy
up all the outstanding stock of a public corporation, or the corporation
itself might seek to redeem its shares from a number of shareholders. A
public corporation might "spin off" a smaller corporation to a small
group of its shareholders. Or a large publicly held concern could con-
ceivably divide itself into two or more parts, each with a smaller num-
ber of shareholders. But each of these possible courses of action would
seem distinctly less likely than its opposite. The second and third
would require the corporation to divide its business into two or more
parts, a difficult maneuver,125 made especially troublesome by the need
to assign shareholders to different parts of the company while main-
taining the relative value of their holdings. All three courses would
threaten management's power and therefore usually incur its opposi-
tion. The first would create or enlarge concentrated centers of share-
holder power capable of challenging management's exclusive control,
the second would reduce the scope of management's power by split-
ting off a portion of the business and the third would have the same
effect by dividing the company. Finally, the second and third courses
would normally threaten the profitability of the business itself, to the
detriment of both management and shareholders. The component
corporations would have less monopoly power than the single large
company of which they once formed the parts, and if the spin-off or
division cut across related product lines, they might also have fewer
economies of scale.
Nevertheless, the tax rewards of ceasing to be public might over-
weigh all other considerations unless some provision were made to
reduce them. Again, it would seem sufficient to delay the new units'
relief from the appreciation tax for a substantial period beyond the
status-changing event. Under the circumstances something like ten
years should suffice. The period need not be as long as the period
chosen for changes in the other direction because of the nontax con-
siderations mentioned and because when the contemplated changes are
in the nonpublic direction, delaying their tax consequences would
have an especially powerful effect. First, it would reduce the present
value of escaping from the appreciation tax by delaying the change of
tax status. Second, it would subject the shares involved to very heavy
taxation during the period of the delay, because their price would rise
in anticipation of their freedom from the appreciation tax at the end
125. E.g., First Security Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 882 U.S. 45 (1965).
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of the period, and price rises during the period would continue to
incur annual taxation at ordinary-income rates. Third, since the share-
holders could not sell sizeable portions of their holdings in order to pay
taxes on the remainder without dispersing ownership and thereby
defeating the whole tax avoidance scheme, their high tax liabilities
would have to be paid out of other assets. And finally, the third effect
would reinforce the second. The necessity of limiting sales would
drive the price of the shares higher and so impose even greater tax
liabilities.
There might be an exception to the ten year delay for companies
whose stockholders could show that there was no longer a readily avail-
able market for their shares and that the disappearance of the market
was not a result of their own tax-motivated actions. The appreciation
tax would be a real hardship for such investors since they could not
conveniently sell shares in the company to meet the tax assessments.
These corporations are also likely to be the ones which lack a suffi-
cient volume of recent trading to measure their appreciation during
the year. For the sake of avoiding the evaluation problem the Internal
Revenue Service might be just as happy to forego the tax proceeds they
would generate if covered by the appreciation tax.
Once established, delay periods could be used for a variety of regu-
latory purposes. For example, since current tax law strongly favors
corporate mergers,' 26 overall tax neutrality might be achieved by
choosing a somewhat shorter delay period for corporate acquisition or
combinations than for other methods of going public. If an acquisition
or combination involving a sufficient number of shareholders to
render the combined corporation public would result in the shares
becoming subject to the appreciation tax in, say, only ten years instead
of fifteen or twenty, shareholders' reluctance to incur the appreciation
tax might just offset their eagerness to receive the more traditional
tax benefits of combining corporate units, and would leave their de-
cision, as it probably should be, unaffected by the totality of tax
factors.
The difficulties that might arise from a too frequent or too easily
manipulated change of status could also be alleviated by establishing
126. Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REv. 254 (1957). There are
also powerful nontax pro-consolidation forces at work in the economy, see McCarthy,
ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS 11-13 (1963); Houghton, Mergers, Superconcentration and the
Public Interest, in SUBcoMM. ON ANTITRUsT & MONOPOLY OF TIlE SENATE COMM. ON TlE
JUDICIARY, ADMINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC Poucy, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963) [hereinafter cited as ADtINISTERED PRICES].
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not one but two changeover lines: the higher one to operate to change
a company's status from nonpublic to public and the lower to change it
from public to nonpublic. A corporation that became public by virtue
of an increase in the number of its shareholders could then lose the
status only if the number was quite substantially reduced, and a similar
result would follow from a change in the other direction.
III. New Shareholders and an Altered Market
Taxing public stock appreciation like ordinary income would also
bring a fairer distribution of corporate profits. One per cent of the
population now holds 70 per cent of the stock,2 7 and so receives a like
percentage of the profits, yet it is the public generally, not shareholders,
that contributes most to the ability of public corporations to earn their
profits.
The public contributes most importantly by supplying funds for
investment. An overwhelming proportion of public corporations'
equity capital comes from retained earnings.us A major source of these
earnings is the power over price which any large, established unit has
in a modern industrial economy. 12 9 Theoretically, the antitrust laws
could eliminate such power by fragmenting business into much smaller
units, but such a course is politically unfeasible and would probably
beget more problems than it would solve.130 A measure of monopoly
power is therefore inherent in the kind of economy the nation has
chosen. A consequence is that unless we decide to regulate the prices
charged by every company as we regulate those of public utilities,
prices will continue to be set high enough to provide the profits
127. Eighty-two per cent of individually held stock is held by or for the benefit of
one per cent of the population. See text accompanying notes 27-34 supra. About 14 per
cent of all common stocks are held by institutions other than common trust funds and
investment companies (which are essentially just conduits for individual stock ownership).
See note 34 supra. Eighty-two per cent of 86 per cent is 70 per cent.
128. see text accompanying notes 80-87 supra.
129. A. KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPRISE IN A CompErrrisv EcoNomy 47-52 and ch. 8, at 154-69
(1964); A. BEi.a, supra note 77, at 82, 89-90 (1959). And see A. SiloNFm, ,Moarn CAPITAL-
ism: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIvATE PowaR 371 and 372-73 n.46 (1965).(Only very large firms can support adequate research and development programs, and
firms with such programs have a great competitive advantage, especially in obtaining
defense work.)
130. The ability of business to caFy out long-range research and development would
be impaired, price stability characteristic of oligopolistic and administered markets would
be eliminated, and the conformability of private business to conscious direction in the
public interest would be reduced. SHoNr-rm, supra note 129, at 371; A. BERLE, supra note
77, at 89; Barnes, Considerations Concerning a Public Policy Toward Administered Prices,
in ADmnNisrED PsCES 44, 50-53; Adams g= Lanzilotti, The Reality of Administered Prices,
in ADmIsNI D PRIcEs 5, 17-18. See also Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1966, at 1, col. 6, and
16, cols. 1-5 (copper users seek substitutes because of wide price fluctuations).
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necessary to pay dividends and to supply necessary equity capital.
There is nothing necessarily wrong with such a system. It provides
capital at very low cost, and it provides the largest supply of invest-
ment funds to those organizations that have indicated by their success
that they can use it most efficiently. But the system is now operating
unjustly because it fails to return to a broad segment of the economy
a proportionate share of the profits derived from the capital provided
by all consumers.
In addition, the public pays for most research and development,
which now provides the principal stimulus and support for corporate
growth.131 Federal taxes pay 60 per cent of the costs of all industrial
research and development. 32 In fiscal year 1961-62 federal support
totalled about $10 billion, 33 nearly as much as the total profits of $13.5
billion earned in 1962 by the 500 largest industrial corporations,3 4
among whom it can be assumed were nearly all the direct beneficiaries
of the support. By 1965 federal support had increased to $15 billion
and, in the words of the National Commission on Technology, Auto-
mation and Economic Progress, was "still rising rapidly."'' 3 The cor-
porations that actually carry on the federally financed research and
development often obtain an additional advantage at public expense in
being allowed to retain and exploit whatever patentable inventions
result. 36 The amount of research and development assistance corpora-
tions obtain from state governments and private endowments through
the use of university and other nonprofit facilities has apparently never
been measured.
Despite these public contributions, the present tax system effectively
excludes all but a small portion of the population from a significant
share of public corporation profits. By favoring income received in
the form of appreciation, the system shifts most of the burden of
financing federal expenditures on to wage and salaried income. Thus,
recipients of such ordinary income are in the doubly unfortunate
position of financing corporate expansion with uncompensated con-
tributions of funds they might otherwise invest in these same corpora-
tions.
131. SHONFIELD, supra note 129, ch. III, at 40-60; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TECIINOLOOY,
AUTOMATION, AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS, TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERAN EcoNOiY 103 (1966),
132. 12 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR RESEARCUi DEVELOPMENT
AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES 5 (1964).
133. Id.
134. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 494, Table 677.
135. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TECHNOLOGY, supra note 131, at 103.
136. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint
Economic Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (March 28, 29 and April 1, 1963).
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The present tax system imposes a subtler obstacle to broad stock
ownership by inflating share prices beyond their worth to investors who
are not already sufficiently wealthy to be in a high tax bracket.
When investment income is tax-exempt in whole or in part the
underlying asset is on that account more valuable. Its additional value
always varies directly with the height of the owner's tax bracket, be-
cause the higher the bracket the more tax he would have to pay if
income on the asset were fully taxable. The value of the partial tax
exemption for common stock appreciation also depends on how long
the owner expects to keep his shares and how he expects eventually to
dispose of them. Capital gains taxes on appreciation apply only if and
when shares are sold or exchanged and are forgiven altogether for
appreciation accrued to the time of death. 3 7 The partial tax exemp-
tion can thus be transformed into a total exemption if shares are held
long enough or disposed of otherwise than by sale or exchange.
It follows that common stocks typically have a great additional value
for the wealthy holder. He is in a high tax bracket, and since his
wealth typically enables him to live without dipping into principal,
he characteristically retains his shares for long periods and disposes of
them by gift or bequest. Their additional value is distinctly less for a
holder of moderate means. His tax bracket is only moderately high
and he is much more likely than is a wealthy holder to dispose of his
shares quickly and in a taxable manner. They carry no additional
value whatever for an organization that is tax-exempt, because it in
effect has a "zero tax bracket" and never pays a tax no matter how it
disposes of its shares. Schools, foundations, religious institutions38 and
pension trusts,139 among others, thus gain nothing from the tax privi-
leges conferred on stocks.
The additional value which tax-exempt assets have for some owners
means that they will bring a higher price: a "basic" price at which
they would sell if their income were fully taxable plus a "premium"
attributable to their tax-exempt status. In a market which includes
purchasers for whom tax exemption has different values, a tax-exempt
asset will sell at a premium no greater than the highest value the
premium has for any purchaser. Normally it will sell considerably
lower, because there are not enough highest-value purchasers to bid
it near to the upper limit. Thus, municipal bonds whose interest is
137. IRC § 1001, 1002, 1014.
138. IRC § 501.
159. IRC §§ 401, 501(a).
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exempt from federal income tax commonly sell for about a third again
as much relative to the interest they bear as do taxable bonds of com-
parable risk, but they nevertheless are still worth about twice their
price in taxable bonds to a taxpayer in the highest bracket.140 The
premium at which corporate stocks commonly sell cannot be so
easily measured, because there is no class of fully taxable stock,
analogous to taxable bonds, with which to compare them. The size of
the premium can only be estimated.
Unlike bonds, for which the tax exemption always has the same
value in the hands of a given holder, the value of the special tax treat-
ment of common stocks varies not only with the tax bracket, expected
holding period and intended manner of disposition of each given
holder but also with the proportion of the stock's income which is in
appreciation rather than dividends. For only the appreciation is
essentially free from tax. "Growth stocks" thus should sell at relatively
high premiums, whereas stocks with high dividends but low apprecia-
tion presumably sell at little or no premium. The difference in pre-
miums between the two kinds of stocks, moreover, is much more than
proportionate to the difference in their appreciation, because premiums
on appreciation tend to "snowball." Too complex to be worked out in
detail here,14 1 the snowball effect can be suggested thus: the greater a
stock's reputation as a growth stock, the greater is the premium at
which it will sell, but since the premium itself appears as a portion of
the price of the stock, it too appreciates and so adds to the total amount
of appreciation, which in turn justifies a higher premium, and so on.
These complications make it difficult to determine the premium for
any particular stock, but they leave no room for doubt that in general
premiums must be high. The capitalized value to a high bracket, long
140. Compare yields on high grade municipal bonds for 1960-1963, STANDARD AND PooR's
CORPORATION, 1964 S curi'Y PaicE INDEX REcoRD 203, with yields on high grade corporate
bonds for the same period, id. at 183.
141. The premium which would exactly compensate a shareholder in a tax bracket r
for not having to pay any tax on the appreciation of a share of stock that would sell at
price P, if appreciation were fully taxable, can be computed from the formula,
I
Premium = Pt(l -r)d
-1
Pear
The symbol a is the percentage annual rate of appreciation, and d is the annual dollar
amount of dividends per share. Examination of -the formula discloses that for holders ln
the higher brackets the size of the premium becomes extremely large as the ratio of the
appreciation rate to the dividend rate is increased and that, in fact, for ratios beyond 3
or 4 to 1 for high bracket shareholders the formula "blows up." The latter means that
for such shareholders, "growth stocks," no matter what premium they sell at, are a bargain,
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term shareholder of not having to pay an annual tax on a normally
appreciating stock is substantial; and high bracket, long term share-
holders constitute a large proportion of the market. A reasonable
guess is that significantly appreciating common stocks sell today for
something like one and a half to two times what they would sell for
if their appreciation were fully taxable.14
Premiums aggravate stock fluctuations as well as increase prices.
Since they increase the less predictable appreciation element of a
stock's value relative to its dividend element, the effect of premiums is
to place total stock value on a less stable ground.
It might be thought that although an average income individual or
tax-exempt institution obtains nothing of personal value in return for
the premium he pays for appreciating stock, it costs him nothing
either, because the premium, along with its appreciation, is returned
to him when the stock is sold. But the loss which a premium inflicts on
such a shareholder shows up in his dividends, not his appreciation.
Suppose that Stock A sells for $170 per share under the present system
but would sell for only $100 if its appreciation were fully taxed, and
that its value doubles in ten years. Middle-income investor Jones
could under the present system buy ten shares for $1700, collect what-
ever dividends were paid and benefit from $1700 appreciation after
ten years. Under the full-tax system he could purchase seventeen shares
for the same amount of money and benefit from the same amount of
appreciation ($1700) in ten years, but in the meantime he would have
collected whatever dividends were paid on seventeen shares instead
of ten. The premium under the present system costs him ten years'
dividends on seven shares. A wealthy investor, too, could of course
purchase more dividends for the same amount of money under a full-
tax system, but for him the advantage of receiving them would be more
than offset by having to pay more tax (or having to pay tax at all) on
the same amount of appreciation.
It might also be thought that with average book-value appreciation of
142. For example, common stocks listed on the NYSE have recently sold for from 17
to 18 times earnings per share, which means that their "return" is between 5 and 6 per
cent. STANDARD AND POO's CoRPORATIoN, TRADE AND SECURITIES, CURRE 'T STATISTICS Con-
BINED WITH BAsIc STATISrics 58-59 (January 1966). Yet taxable corporate bonds, which are
a more secure investment and far less speculative in the short run, provided returns of
only slightly less than 5 per cent during the same period. Id. at 60-61. Tax factors aside,
One would expect shares to have a distinctly higher return than bonds, to sell, say, at
about 10 times earnings. The 17-to-18 times-earnings figure, moreover, is only an average,
and "growth stocks" typically sell at a higher multiple of earnings than the average.
See, e.g., 1 STANDARD AND PooR's CORPORATION, INDUSTRY SuRvEys C-54 (February 24, 1966)
(chemical stocks).
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6 to 7 per cent per year 143 and dividends of 3 to 4 per cent,144 public
stocks are such a good investment even to low-bracket taxpayers that tie
effect of the tax system on stock prices cannot be blamed for the failure
of middle income families to invest more in public stocks. But stock
prices may reflect book-value appreciation only in the very long run. In
recent times price fluctuations have taken as long as ten years to iron
themselves out sufficiently for the average rate of growth to assert it-
self.145 A family man with only moderate savings ordinarily cannot
count on being able to wait that long: medical expenses, his children's
education, retirement and other contingencies are all too likely to
intervene. He is therefore inclined to invest in insurance, home owner-
ship, a savings account or savings bonds. Institutional investors, which
are the repositories for most of the wealth in the lower tax brackets, are
also required by their fiduciary responsibilities to give substantial
weight to the short-term uncertainties of the market.1 40 The very
wealthy, on the other hand, are able to hold shares with the assurance
that they can ride out price uncertainties.
The relative advantages would be reversed if appreciation were
taxed like ordinary income. The necessity of paying tax on all
their profits would sharply reduce the desirability of public stocks
to high income investors, and the elimination of premiums would
increase their desirability to lower income and institutional investors.
The result would be to distribute corporate wealth much more
broadly. The lower and less variable price of public stock would make
it a safer and more profitable investment for moderate-income in-
dividuals. Mutual-fund shares, and even direct holdings, would there-
fore become an important and profitable part of the personal savings
of a much broader segment of the population. Insurance companies
and other partially tax-exempt organizations would be stimulated to
purchase more public shares and provide a better return on their
investment. But especially, tax-exempt institutions, which stand to
gain the most from the elimination of tax premiums, could increase
their holdings substantially and distribute their augmented benefits to
the entire population. Something close to the long-discussed "share-
holder democracy" would finally be a reality, not in the impossible
sense of direct popular control of management decisions, but in the
143. See note 24 supra.
144. See NYSE FACT BooK 1965, at 47.
145. See authorities cited notes 23-24 supra.
146. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Dec. 21, 1966, at 1, col. 5, and 10, col. 1.
660
Vol. 76: 623, 1967
Taxing Stock Appreciation
entirely possible, and just, sense of the widest feasible participation in
the benefits of the corporate economy. 147
The reduction in stock prices caused by the removal of their tax
advantages should occur gradually, as a failure of prices to rise from
their level at the time the tax became effective rather than as a drop
from that level. The tax would, of course, apply only to a taxpayer's
net gains during the year, and presumably a net loss in any year could
be carried forward to be netted against net gains in succeeding years.
Since the tax would apply only to price increases occurring after its
effective date, there would be no tax-related reason for selling at a
price less than that which prevailed on that date and therefore no
tendency for the market to be driven to a lower level. Any drop that
nevertheless occurred would inflict losses which could be used to render
future market gains taxfree but which would be a dead loss if the
taxpayer did not stay in, or soon re-enter, the market. The enactment
of the tax thus ought to have a supportive effect on prices up to the level
of the market on the effective date. A rise above that level, on the other
hand, would trigger more than the usual volume of selling by share-
holders in the highest tax brackets and so would proceed with less than
usual speed. And the many years' pause in the upward movement of
the market necessary to squeeze out tax premiums should permit the
shift of share ownership to be carried out in an orderly manner.148
The tax's effect of reducing the market's volatility40 would have the
147. See A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 Coumr.. L Riv. 1, 17-18
(1965); Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 CoLuss. L. REv. 433, 449 (192).
148. The securities industry ought also to benefit from a tax on stock appreciation. The
fees of brokers and investment advisers are commonly based upon the dollar volume of the
sales they handle. SPECLL STUDY pt. II, 25-30. Since the demand for newly 1sued stock
would probably increase, the price of new issues relative to other investments should rise
as should the frequency with which new issues are floated. Although the prices of out-
standing stocks would be less relative to other investments than they are now, the effect
of lower prices on brokers' commissions should be more than offset by the increased
frequency of trading. The fact that the appreciation tax would be assessed annually
would also tend to encourage a more rapid turnover. For the very wealthy, who can
afford to spend a lifetime without dipping into their savings (see text accompanying
notes 45-48), would no longer have a tax incentive to hold onto stock until a death in the
family gives them a stepped-up basis. Mutual funds, which tend to serve the small investor
(SPECLM STUDY pt. IV, at 140), would also benefit from the redistribution in stock owner-
ship brought about by the tax change.
149. The elimination of tax premiums would place stock prices on a more stable ground.
In addition, the appreciation tax would have a stabilizing effect of its own. Whenever the
price of a stock rose sharply, its holders would incur large tax liabilities, payable during
the spring of the year after the rise occurred. Among the shareholders who have to sell
stock to pay the tax, some would certainly sell early in anticpation of an April selling
rush. Even shareholders with no shortage of cash to meet their tax liabilities would, if
speculatively inclined, sell at or near the peak of the rise. Thus, every unusual rise would
produce forces tending to reverse it, and the higher it went, the more powerfully would
those forces operate. Similarly, any drop in stock prices would create "tax asscts," that
is, paper losses which for tax purposes could be offset against gains from other stock
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benefit of reducing year-to-year fluctuations in the revenue from the
tax itself. The several averaging steps involved in levying the tax would
also have that effect. As we have seen, each year's "official tax value"
would be the average of a stock's daily prices over some extended period
during the year. Taxpayers presumably would be permitted to average
their gains and losses on all their stocks during each year to determine
their net gain or loss for the year. And they presumably would also
be allowed to average their yearly net gains or losses over something
like five successive years to determine their tax liability for each partic-
ular year. Finally, of course, total national revenue from the tax
would be determined by the statistical average of the tax liabilities of
all the individual taxpayers subject to the tax. Annual revenue would
thus be based on four successive averages, and even its ultimate basis,
the prices of particular stocks, would have been rendered less variable
by the tax's smoothing effect on the market. The resulting amount
would hardly fluctuate any more than other tax revenues which rise
and fall with the general level of economic activity. And like them, any
fluctuations would usually be in phase with the general level of eco-
nomic activity and thus exert a helpful countercyclical effect.
The elimination of their tax immunities would make public stocks
seem overpriced to most high-bracket taxpayers. As they switched out
of stocks into other investments, prices might rise initially in the
markets for both fixed-yield securities and high-risk investments, such
as real estate and oil wells, that still offered tax immunities. But the
rise, if any, would be short-lived. No permanently greater supply of
funds available for such other investments would have been created,
because for each high-bracket taxpayer who sold public stocks in order
to be able to switch into other investments there would necessarily have
to be a lower-bracket taxpayer who bought them and who would there-
fore have correspondingly fewer funds available for other investments.
In fact, if application of the new tax had any transitional influence
at all on the price of investments other than public stocks, it would
tend to decrease the demand for them as part of the deflationary pres-
sure it exerted throughout the economy and so lower their price. In-
dividuals and institutions holding substantial amounts of public stock
tend to spend more. Its presence, like that of any reasonably liquidable
wealth, provides protection against contingencies and savings for
holders, past, present or future. Shareholders on that account would be more likely to
ride out a fall in the market, and the reduced tendency to sell would act as a restraining
influence on a bear market.
662
Vol. 76: 623, 1967
Taxing Stock Appreciation
future needs and so frees the holder to spend more for current pur-
poses. When the prices of public stocks tended to level out in response
to the application of the tax, therefore, shareholders would tend to spend
less, and the aggregate demand for all other kinds of investments would
decline. If during the time it took to squeeze out the premium the econ-
omy happened to be in need of some deflationary pressure, the effect
could simply be accepted; otherwise, appropriate fiscal and/or monetary
inflationary measures would have to be taken to offset it. In either event,
wealth would be shifted from public shareholders to others. The share-
holders would lose because the prices of their shares would not rise
as rapidly as they had in the past. Others in the economy would gain,
either because the goods and services they purchased would be cheaper
(if the deflationary pressure were accepted) or because they had more
money (if taxes were lowered, bank credit expanded or other infla-
tionary measures taken).
The tax would have no permanent effect on the prices of investments
other than public stocks. The price of any investment is set by four
factors: the public's assessment of its probable rate of return and of its
risk, its tax treatment and the going interest rate. The new tax could
possibly have an effect only on the fourth factor, but if it did, the
government could offset the effect through the operations of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, one of whose principal functions is to control
interest rates' 50 Thus, any change in the general price level of other
investments which occurred subsequent to the imposition of the tax
would represent a Federal Reserve policy choice that the change should
occur, not an unavoidable effect of the tax.
It is, of course, impossible to predict every effect of a proposal
marking so radical a departure from the status quo. Transitional
effects are especially difficult to foresee, because they would depend
greatly on the popular reaction to the tax. The stock market is a
notorious ground for the fulfillment of self-fulfilling prophecies. If
enough people believed that the tax would tumble the market, or even
feared that it might, then it would. It might therefore be advisable to
accompany the enactment of the tax with a set of discretionary tax-
cutting and market-supporting measures; their existence alone would
alleviate fears and so avoid a market crash. In the end, however, sanity
would no doubt prevail. Much of the volatility, and some of the
glamour, would be taken out of the stock market, and public stocks
150. See note 179 infra.
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would settle into their place as one more source of income among the
many available to an individual or organization with savings to invest,
taxable just like interest, rents or pensions.
IV. The Chimera of Double Taxation
A. Taxes and Profits
The proposed tax would radically redistribute the burden of the
federal income tax and ultimately bring about a wider dissemination
of the profits of big business. Hence, it will be vigorously opposed. One
certain objection 5 1 is "double taxation"-the alleged unfairness of
taxing stock appreciation as individual income when it is already
subject to the 48 per cent levy on corporate income. Supposedly, corpo-
rate profits are reduced by about half before the shareholders benefit
from them. According to this argument, even the present application of
the individual income tax to dividends constitutes "double taxation."
Applying it also to appreciation would complete the injustice. But in
fact, the 48 per cent corporation income tax is not reducing corporate
profits by anything close to that amount, because the corporate econ-
omy has long since shifted all, or at least substantially all, the tax for-
ward to the consumer in the form of higher prices.15 2
For many years, it was economic orthodoxy that the burden of the
151. See, e.g., Humphrey, How the New Tax Bill Can Promote Prosperity, L=, Afar.
15, 1954, at 37-43; D. HOLLAND, THE INcOME TAX BURDEN ON STOCKHOLDERS xi and passim
(1958) (entire book written on assumption that shareholders bear at least half of the
corporation income tax); D. SMITH, FEDERAL TAx REFORM, T11E ISSUES AND A PROORAM
189-203 (1961).
152. The discussion that follows assumes for simplicity that the principal method of
shifting the corporation income tax, by raising prices, is the only method. There are
others. As will be argued below, a long-range failure to shift the tax to consumers may
result in not just an impairment of shareholders' profits but also of labor's; i.e., a failure
to shift the tax to consumers may result in a partial shift to labor. To an indeterminate
but probably substantial extent there is also shifting back to the government-a shift
that operates as a reduction of the effective tax rate, The laws permitting the value of
an asset to be depreciated for tax purposes more rapidly than it actually declines, e.g.,
IRC § 167-70, operate to defer taxes and so give a corporation the use of money that It
would otherwise have to pay currently to the government. Such money, since the obliga-
tion to repay it at the deferred day of tax reckoning is dependent upon there then being
sufficient profits to permit repayment, is essentially that most valuable kind of money-
equity money, available for high-risk investments. Estimating its value conservatively at
10 per cent per year, the value to a corporation of being able to defer the first 5 years'
tax on the profits of an asset with a useful life of 10 years until the last 5 years of its life
is about one-fourth -the amount of the entire tax. The effective rate on the asset is thus
reduced from 48 per cent to 36 per cent, 12 per cent being "passed back" to the govern.
ment. Cf. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.'2d 318 (5th Cir. 1966) (FP0
may require natural-gas company to pass on to consumers savings from accelerated depre-
ciation permitted by IRO § 167). Because this and other methods of shifting also exist,
the method of raising prices does not have to bear the whole burden of keeping profits at
their pre-tax level.
664
Vol. 76: 623, 1967
Taxing Stock Appreciation
corporation income tax fell on the corporation and its stockholders. 10
If the firm were assumed to be maximizing profits, supposedly the
normal behavior in both competitive and monopolistic markets, it
followed that the tax could not be shifted. The profit-maximizing
output of the firm is determined by its marginal revenue and marginal
cost for additional units of production, which in turn are dependent
upon the demand for the firm's output and the cost of inputs. Because
neither demand levels nor input costs seemed to be affected by a
"mere" profits tax, economists traditionally thought that the profit-
maximizing level of output would be unchanged by the imposition of
the tax. The hapless entrepreneur could do no better than to continue
at his pre-tax level of output, turning over part of his profits to the
government.
Modem economic theory, however, is more optimistic about the
ability of corporate business to shift the corporation income tax for-
ward to consumers. Obviously, if businesses are not in fact maximiz-
ing profits-in the sense of equating marginal revenue and marginal
costs---they may be able by raising prices to shift forward part of the
tax,154 and there is increasing agreement that businessmen work for
153. To avoid misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that my concern is only with
the shifting that occurs from shareholders (which is to say, from corporate equity capital),
not from capital generally or even from corporate capital generally. Thus, the conclusion
drawn by Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. Eco.%. 215(1962), that the corporate income tax is in substantial part not shifted from capital (gener-
ally) is not directly pertinent here.
But it can be made pertinent. Professor Iarberger's conclusion rests on the premise that
the market for capital throughout the United States is sufficiently fluid, or "perfect," that
the return net of risk and tax on all kinds of capital tends toward uniformity in the long
run. Id. at 215-17. So his conclusion that capital generally bears the burden of the tax
is tantamount to saying that the tax is "spread out" over all the capital in the economy,
uniformly reducing returns everywhere. Since the total amount of capital is approximately
four times the amount of corporate equity capital (see STATirSCAL Au'mscr 407, Table 549
(debt capital); 490, Table 671 (relative amounts of corporate and noncorporate business);
495, Table 679 (corporate equity capital)), even if his conclusion that none of the burden
of the corporate income tax is shifted from capital generally is correct, corporate equity
capital itself will bear only a fourth of it. That is, about 75 per cent shifting from share-
holders does occur.
However, Professor Harberger's reliance on the premise undermines even his own initial
conclusion. It follows from the premise that if the return on any kind of capital has
been reduced by the corporation income tax, so has the return on debt capital, and by
the same amount. But if interest rates are lower than they would be absent the tax, it
must be because the tax has influenced the thinking of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, which controls the level of interest rates. However, Professor
Harberger's demonstration contained no reference to government monetary policy.
154. An oligopolistic industry might not be producing at a profit-maximizing level
either because the members fear that antitrust eyebrows will be raised if they make a
concerted effort to find the profit-maximizing level of output and prices, or because side-
payments among firms would be required to obtain agreement upon the price which
would maximize industry-wide profits. Cf. W. FEj.Nm Comprmo A-mo.o Tm FEvr
(1949).
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goals other than profit maximization.1 55 But even in an economy of
profit-maximizers, the corporate income tax is passed on if the proceeds
of the tax finance additional government spending which, in turn,
causes sufficient inflation to restore the old level of net corporate
profits' 5 This result is consistent with profit-maximizing, because the
rise in total spending has changed the companies' demand functions.
The result is no different than if a general sales tax had been imposed
instead.
But one need not resort to economic theory to get a rough picture
of how taxes are commonly shifted in two sectors of the economy
which together include most of the public corporations. The govern-
ment commissions that set prices for the regulated industries5 7 are
required by law or custom to set them high enough for companies
under their jurisdiction to earn profits equal to some fixed proportion,
usually about 6 per cent, of their invested capital. An income tax on
profits is regarded as an additional cost, which the regulated companies
are allowed to cover by raising prices. Where the regulated company
has a complete, or nearly complete, local monopoly on whatever it sells,
it faces no effective restraint on its power to raise prices and so will do
so to the full amount allowed. Even where regulated competition exists
(for example, between railroads and trucks), the result is ultimately
the same, because the commissions will, if necessary, force both com-
petitors' prices up to prevent either from making "uncompensa-
tory" marginal profits at the other's expense.1 8  Regulated industries
155. See, e.g., E. PENROSE, THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRIN (1959).
156. In a time of rapidly rising aggregate demand, the ability of the corporation to
shift the burden of the corporation income tax will be enhanced by the fact that wages
and salaries are likely to rise less quickly than commodity prices. If all prices were com-
pletely flexible, input costs would move up as rapidly as output costs, and shifting could
not occur so readily.
157. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 115-3-1(1). See generally NicboLs, RULING PRINCIPLXS OF
UTiLrry R GULATIONS, RATE OF RE'Uxu ch. 1, §§ 1 and 2, at 1-7 (1955).
158. NIcHoLs, supra note 157, ch. 1, § 1, at 1, and ch. 24, § 4, at 435; Cook & Cohn,
Capital Structures for Public Utilities Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
45 VA. L. Rv. 981, 997-98 (1959). The actual process of rate setting is more complicated
than the text indicates, but the result is the same. Rates are set with reference to a "base"
that normally equals, or is closely related to, gross investment. For example, a utility
with assets of $100 million, debt of $60 million and shareholder equity of $40 million,
might have its rates set so as to guarantee a return of 6 per cent on $100 million, not $40
million. Utility managements therefore commonly try to borrow as much as they safely
can at interest rates below the rate of return on their "base," in order to increase vrofits
on shareholders' equity. Cook & Cohn, supra note 158, at 981, 998-1001. However, it can
easily be demonstrated that an increase in rates sufficient to keep the return on the "base"
at 6 per cent despite an increase in taxes will also keep the return on shareholders' equity
at the same level as before the tax increase. See, e.g., All Freight from Eastern Ports to
the South, 251 I.C.C. 361 (1942); All Commodities, L.C.L., between Maine, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire, 25 I.C.C. 85 (1942) (regulated competition).
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account for 12 to 16 per cent of the corporate business in the
country.0 9 Most of the prices set by large corporations outside of the
regulated industries are "administered," that is, set by deliberate
private decision. 6 0 One company announces a price, which the others
then parallel or lower. The process ends when all prices reach the
level of those of the lowest-priced company having significant market
power. But since every company wants to keep its profits as high as
possible without inviting new competition or serious public dis-
approval, prices normally end up high enough to provide what the
industry consensus regards as a reasonable return on capital for most
companies in the industry.'"' And since here too taxes are regarded as
costs, the "reasonable" return is net of taxes and thus the same what-
ever the tax late. 62
The evidence points to the conclusion that the shifting forward of
the corporation income tax has been substantially complete. Although
the necessary data are not available for earlier periods,0a3 in which
there was no corporation income tax, the double taxation argument
is seriously damaged if it can be shown that, betAveen the nineteen-
twenties and the present, corporations have been successful in shifting
the great increase in corporation taxes.
During the late twenties, the federal corporation income tax ranged
from 11 to 13; per cent;'0 4 from 1951 to 1965, the tax was between
48 and 52 per cent.0 5 In addition, state corporation income taxes were
rare in the twenties but had become common in the fifties.10 0 The
159. In 1962, assets of utilities accounted for about 12 per cent of all corporate assets,
and profits of utilities accounted for about 16 per cent of all corporate profits. STrntscAx
ABSRACr 498, Table 684, and 499, Table 687.
160. KAPLAI , DR.ASI, & LA1zit.LoTE, PRICING IN BIG BusiNEss 1-0 (1958). See ANN. R.W.
OF Tn Couxcii. or EcoNoMIc ADvisoRs 88 (1958), printed as part of the 1936 Ecosowc
REPORT or THm P RsImErT ("The exact diagnosis [of inflation not caused by excessive de-
mand] remains a matter of some disagreement among economists. But almost all agree
that an important part of the explanation lies in the fact that, in many industries, unions
or managements or both possess considerable discretionary power to set wages and
prices, . .,.
161. See Means, Pricing Power and the Public Interest, and Means, The Reality of
Administered Prices, in THE CORPORATE REVOLUTION iN A.mmmrc& 77-96, 213-22, 226 (1962).
See also KAPLAN, DiRLAm & LANziLLoTE, supra note 160, at 130.
162. Means, Pricing Power, supra note 161, at 221-22.
163. See HisrolIcAsL STATSTICS 581, 582-85, for other relevant data.
164. CCH 1966 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 153.
165. TAx FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 67, at 110-Il, Table 86.
166. UNrrEr STATES ADVISORY C070IISSION ON INTERCOVERN.MENTAL REATIONS, TAx
OVERLAPPING IN TE UNITED STATES 25-26 (1964). Thirteen states had a corporation
income tax before 1929. Thirty-seven plus the District of Columbia now do. From 1959 to
1963 one state enacted a corporation income tax, 12 raised their rates, two raised their
rates twice and one repealed its tax. See also TAx FOUNDATION, IN€-, sulpa note 67, at
174-75. The combined effect of federal and state corporate income taxes is compared for
1929, 1939, 1949, 1959, 1962, and 1963 in id. at 43, Table 26. See rows entitled "Corporate
profits before tax" and "Corporate profits tax liability."
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depression of the thirties was a period of abnormally low corporate
profits. If depression rates of return were used as a base, the postwar
corporation income tax would seem to be the handmaiden of a great
increase in profits on equity capital. 107 The late twenties, on the other
hand, provide a conservative comparison. If the after-tax rate of profits
on equity capital is as high today as it was then, surely the much higher
corporate income tax today cannot be having an appreciable effect.
The First National City Bank of New York has kept records which
reveal the average ratio of corporate profits to net assets every year
since 1925 for manufacturing corporations and every year since 1928
for all corporations. 168 The records are accurate; 69 they cover about
90 per cent of the corporate economy, 70 and the firms they represent
are almost all publicly held corporations.171 They are, therefore, ideal
for our purposes.
These records disclose that corporate profits after taxes relative
to investment today are slightly higher than they were when the
corporation income tax took a much smaller portion of before-tax
profits. According to First National City, the average after-tax rate of
return was 10.4 per cent from 1950 through 1964, and 10.3 per cent
from the years 1928 and 1929.172 Thus, despite a near quadrupling in
the level of the federal corporation income tax and the imposition of
numerous state corporation income taxes, the after-tax return onv
shareholder investment is at least as high today as it was in the twen-
ties.'73
But historical comparisons are unnecessary to refute the assertion
that the current corporation income tax rates of about 50 per cent are
167. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS 580-81. Profits as a percentage of shareholders' equity
can be computed by dividing the amounts shown in Ser. 95 by the sum of the amounts
shown in Ser. 81-85.
168. ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, FR NATIONAL CITY BANK, NEw YORK, AVERAOE ANNUAL
RATES OF RETuRN.
169. Lewis, Corporate Profits, FINANCIAL ANALYsTs' J. 40-41 (July-August 1964).
170. Id.
171. Id.; ECONOMICs DEPARTMENT, FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, supra note 168. The
First National City Bank records are made up from published reports of corporations to
their stockholders, which strongly weights them toward publicly held corporations.
172. ECONoMIcs DEPARTMENT, FIRsT NATIONAL CITY BANK, supra note 168. And as this
is being written, unofficial estimates place 1965 profits at a level 16 per cent higher than
1964 profits. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 17, 1966, at 1, col. 6, and 8, col. 2. See also Hall,
Direct Shifting of the Corporation Income Tax in Manufacturing, 54 Am. ECON. REV.
Supp. 258, 271 n.9 (1964) (average rate of profit after taxes on gross investment in 1919-S0
and 1936-40 was 5.94 per cent and in 1941-59, 5.97 per cent).
173. The recent empirical study of Krzyzaniak and Musgrave supports this conclusion.
The authors developed an econometric model of the corporate economy of the United
States and, on the basis of this model, determined that the corporation income tax had
in fact been slightly over-shifted. M. KRZYZANIAK 8 R. MUSGRAvE, Tim SIFrTING OF Tim
CORPORATION INcoEm TAx (1963).
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reducing corporate income by anything close to 50 per cent. The
double taxation argument involves an assumption that "normal"
corporate profits are twice those actually being earned. Under that
assumption, the rate of profits on shareholders' equity in manufactur-
ing corporations during the first half of 1965 would have been 26 per
cent, instead of its actual 13.0 per cent,' 4 the average rate for the four
largest automobile manufactures in 1963 would have been 39.8 per
cent,175 and for General Motors alone in 1963, 46 per cent'--c-nearly
enough profits to buy another General Motors every two yearsl Rates
of return as high as these would be an absurdity in a mature industrial
economy. Yet the "double taxation" argument forces its proponents to
predicate them as the norm.
The "double taxation" argument also assumes a revolution in
federal monetary and debt-management policies that, to say the least,
would be unlikely. Corporate profits do not exist in a vacuum. The
market for capital in the United States (and, increasingly, in the entire
western world) is sufficiently fluid that abnormally high returns in one
sector ultimately bring higher, or are reduced by lower, returns in
other sectors.177 Witness, for example, the strikingly quick and forceful
manner in which higher interest rates drew money away from stocks
and thereby lowered stock prices during the spring and summer of
1966.178 So sustained corporate profits at twice their present levels
would operate to draw interest rates, too, up to commensurately higher
levels. If the Treasury and the Federal Reserve failed to take remedial
measures to increase the availability of credit, to keep interest rates
down,179 rates would rise to levels never before seen in the United
States in modem times. Among other results, the cost of carrying the
national debt would be multiplied and the ability of state and local
governments to borrow would be seriously impaired. But if, as seems
more likely, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve did take remedial
measures, the resulting increased supply of money and lower interest
rates would in time bring down corporate profits too.
One other quantitative measurement indicates that the corporation
174. FTC News Release S-2076 (Sept. 13, 1965).
175. FTC, REPORT oN RATES OF RETuRNi FOR IDENTICAL COMPANIES I SEtECTED M NU-
FACruNG INDUSIMES, 1954-63, at 47, Table 9-3711.
176. Id.
177. Harberger, supra note 153, at 215-17.
178. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1966, at E-1, cols. 1-2; Tobin, Check the Boom, The New
Republic, Sept. 3, 1966, at 10.
179. See RoniNSON, BOEHtLR, GANE & FARwELL, FmANCIAI. INsTrrno.s 673-75 (3d
ed. 1960).
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tax has not reduced profits. Data compiled by Professor Simon Kuznets
of the National Bureau of Economic Research show that from about
the turn of the century to 1930, the share of equity (as opposed to debt)
in long-term corporate external financing averaged 35 per cent, that in
the twenties it reached a relatively high average of 43 per cent and that
almost immediately after the Second World War, it dropped to a
1946-1953 average of 21 per cent.180 The decline has not reversed itself
since the period covered by the study. Except for the atypical AT&T
offering in 1964,181 the share of equity in corporate financing has been
decreasing almost yearly since 1953.182 Indeed, if midyear prognostica-
tions held true, net corporate bond issues for 1965 totaled $8 billion
and net equity issues $800 million-a mere 10 per cent portion for
equity, even disregarding the additional diluting effect of institutional
borrowing other than through bonds.183
The drop in equity financing is too enduring to be merely a chance
deviation. 84 Nor does it seem chance that the history of the corpora-
tion income tax almost exactly parallels that of the debt-equity ratio.
The tax was first enacted in 1909, remained at a modest level until the
Second World War, then shot up sharply, and has remained high
since.18 5 The increases in state income taxes since the war have rein-
forced the impact of the federal tax.
A simple example illustrates how the passing-on of the corporation
tax could account for the parallel development of the tax and the debt-
equity ratio. The Jones Corporation, operating in a tax-free business
world, contemplates a one-million-dollar expansion program upon
which it expects to realize a return in excess of costs of $100,000 per
year. In determining how much of the investment it should borrow
and how much it should finance by selling stock (we are ignoring the
180. S. KuzNErs, CAPITAL IN THE AmERICAN ECONOMY 278, 381-86, 417-19 (1961).
181. AT&T is atypical because as one of the wealthiest natural monopolies in the
world it has a strong political incentive to have as many shareholders as possible. For an
indication of how the support of its shareholders can serve its interest against the FCC,
the agency that regulates it, see Wall Street Journal, Feb. 8, 1966, at 1, col. 1. See also TE
NEW YORKER, Feb. 5, 1966, at 33.
182. Gorman & Shea, Capital Formation, Saving and Credit, SuRvEY oF CURRENT
BUsINEsS, May 1965, at 14-15; Wall Street Journal, August 20, 1965, at 1, 11; STATISTICAL
AaBsTAcr 502, Table 693. The figures given in the cited authorities include the "Comsat"
offering, which should be ignored because it was not for the purpose of raising capital
for an existing company.
183. Wall Street Journal, August 20, 1965, at 1, col. 6 and 12, col. 6.
184. Professor Kuznets explores several possible explanations and remains unsatisfied
that they are sufficient to account for the trend. KuzNrs, supra note 180, at 276-82, 418-19.
185. TAx FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 67, at 110-11, Table 86.
670
Vol. 76: 623, 1967
Taxing Stock Appreciation
possibility of using internally generated equity funds), Jones will take
into account three basic factors: the cost of borrowing, that is, the
interest rate it must pay; the risk of borrowing; and the "cost" of
equity money. The last factor is determined for externally obtained
equity money by comparing the price at which the company can sell
shares of its stock to the return it is already earning on its invested
equity funds; the object is not to dilute the earning power of existing
shares by selling new shares too cheaply, and, if possible, to increase
their earning power.
Suppose that Jones can borrow up to $500,000 from its bankers at
6 per cent and decides to do so to the limit, leaving the remaining
$500,000 to be financed from equity. It can then expect an interest
cost of $30,000 per year and a return on equity of $70,000, or since
$500,000 of equity funds are involved, a rate of return on equity of
14 per cent. If that rate of return is materially better than the price-
earnings ratio of Jones' outstanding stock, the chances are that it can
raise the additional $500,000 by selling new shares, without diluting
its established earning power per share. If it is less, the investment will
not give existing shareholders a profit and should probably not be
undertaken. A measure of the risk of borrowing half the million
dollars needed is that the expected return in excess of costs of $100,000
per year will exceed interest charges by $70,000; if actual earnings fall
short of expected earnings by more than that amount, the company
will be forced to meet its obligations by dipping into receipts from
other operations. The $70,000 is sometimes called the "earnings
coverage.
If a 50 per cent corporate income tax were imposed and generally
not passed on in the form of higher prices, the three factors would
remain the same. The expected after-tax rate of return on the equity
portion of the investment would drop to 7 per cent, but since, by
hypothesis, the rate of return on all corporate equity investment
throughout the economy would have dropped by a like amount, stock
buyers would be just as eager to buy Jones' shares now at its lower
expected rate of return as they were prior to the imposition of the tax,
and the number of shares that would have to be sold to raise the
$500,000 would be no greater than it was before.
But if we assume that the corporate economy generally has been able
to pass on the tax in the form of higher prices, the second of the three
factors-the risk of borrowing-undergoes a striking change. The gen-
erally higher prices prevailing would have increased the total expected
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return of Jones' investment from $100,000 to $170,000.180 That amount
less $30,000 interest, less 50 per cent (for tax) of the balance, leaves
$70,000 after taxes as the return on equity-the same as before. Thus,
actual earnings could now fall short of expected earnings by $140,000-
twice as much as the previous "earnings coverage"-without Jones Cor-
poration having to meet its obligations out of receipts from other opera-
tions. The first and third factors again remain the same. In such a
situation, the company and its bankers would be foolish not to re-assess
the risks involved and substantially increase the amount of the loan. By
doubling "earnings coverage," the corporation income tax has enabled
a given amount of equity to carry with it a much larger amount of debt,
at no greater risk. It is no wonder that the 50 per cent corporate levy in
effect since about the Second World War has profoundly influenced the
course of corporate finance. The SEC has even given official recognition
to the tax's impact in this respect by allowing public utilities to carry
higher debt ratios.sT
B. The Effects of Reduced Profits
The "double taxation" argument has a second weak point, inde-
pendent of any alleged reduction in corporate profits. The conclu-
sion that the application of the individual income tax to the share-
holder would be unfair presupposes that stockholders are uniquely
disadvantaged by any reduction in corporate income resulting from
the corporation income tax. But if the corporate tax were repealed, the
additional after-tax income would ultimately have to be shared with
other income recipients and/or reduced by lowering the prices of
corporate products. Sustained extraordinary profits would almost cer-
tainly bring on irresistible union demands for wage increases. White-
collar employees would participate in the increase too, in part because
management would want to maintain what it considered a proper
ratio between white-collar salaries and wages in the plant, and in part
because when profits are high, management can take some of the credit
and reward itself accordingly. About 44 per cent of the national
186. This is an approximation for the sake of simplicity. Actually, expected earnings
would not have had to rise quite so much in order to bring the after-tax rate of return
on equity up to what it was before the imposition of the tax, because the tax's effect of
reducing the risk of borrowing would have encouraged corporations to borrow more
heavily, which in turn would have increased equity's "leverage" and, consequently, its
rate of return.
187. Cf. Cook & Cohn, Capital Structures of Public Utilities Under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, 45 VA. L. REv. 981, 1001-06 (1959); Cook, We've Got the Most En.
terprising Utility in This Country, FORTUNE, May 1964, at 138, 182.
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income is received as corporate wages or salaries.uss Thus, if the
corporation income tax is really reducing corporation income, about
half the working taxpayers in the country have grounds for joining
shareholders in the cry of "double taxation." But in the important
industries at least-those whose prices figure prominently enough in
the statistical price indices for the government to take notice when
they rise-it is academic to talk of the possibility of much higher
profits than now exist anyway. The recently institutionalized federal
surveillance of all important price changess 9 would ultimately require
that widespread extraordinary profits be shared with consumers
through a price reduction or, more likely, through the slower process
of holding prices steady while wages increased.
Finally, even if the corporation income tax has reduced corporate
profits and the reduction has in turn reduced shareholder income
more, proportionately, than other kinds of income, it still does not
follow that every shareholder has a just cause for complaint if he is
also subjected to an individual income tax. The corporate tax rates
have been at their present level since about 1940. Shares that have been
bought and sold since 1940 have therefore changed hands at a price
that reflected their presumably lower after-tax earnings. The individual
who has purchased his shares since 1940 is therefore earning as much
on his investment as he would had the tax not existedY0
On the other hand, the individual who has owned his shares since
before 1940 has probably been unhurt by the present tax structure
even if the corporation income tax has not been completely passed on.
If it is conceded that half of the burden of the corporation income tax
has been passed on to consumers or others-and the comparative profit
figures leave no reasonable doubt that at least that much must have
been shifted-it can be shown that a shareholder who has held shares
since before 1940 and has been in at least the 50 per cent tax bracket
during most of the intervening years has by now benefited more from
the present tax structure than he would lose from the enactment of a
tax on appreciation.
A 52 per cent corporation income tax that is about half passed on
188. In 1962 national income was $453.7 billion, of which $198.7 billion was compensa-
tion of corporate employees. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERNCE BOARD, TilE EcoNomic
ALmANAC, 1964, 115, 131.
189. See Guideposts for Noninflationary Price and Wage Behavior, 1966 MIN. REP. OF
THE CouNcaL or EcoNomuc AnvisoRs 88-93. See also Government Considers Cut in Structural
Steel Buying as Part of Effort to Push Back Bethlehem Price Rise, Wall Strcet Journal,
Jan. 3, 1966, at 3, col 1-3.
190. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOE TAx 26 (1951).
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would, by definition, reduce $100 of corporate profits to $74. Corpora-
tions generally distribute about two-thirds of their after-tax profits as
dividends.19' About $49 to $50 out of the $74 would therefore be paid
as a dividend, and a shareholder in a 50 percent bracket would be
taxed another $24 to $25 upon its receipt. The $24 to $25 retained by
the corporation and reinvested would not be further taxed. The total
reduction brought about by the combined effect of the corporation
and individual income taxes on the shareholder's $100 of corporate
profits would thus be about $50-exactly the same as he would have
paid in taxes had there been no corporation income tax and he had
instead been taxed directly on his full share of the company's profits,
A similar computation would show that if the shareholder's topmost
tax bracket had exceeded 50 per cent he would have had more left
after taxes under the present system than if he had paid only his
individual rate on his entire share of the company's profits. Prior to
1963, all taxable income above $16,000 for a single person and above
$32,000 for a married couple was taxable at 50 per cent.1 2 Since
corporate stock is very highly concentrated among the wealthyou and
since that stock which has been held for long periods is even more
highly concentrated than stock generally,0 4 it is reasonable to conclude
that almost all stock that has been held continuously since 1940 has
been held by taxpayers with incomes that usually placed them in
brackets of 50 per cent or higher. Such stock, therefore, has contributed
more after-tax income to its owners during the past twenty-five years
than it would have if their share of corporate profits had been taxed
directly as individual income-that is, more than if there had been no
"double taxation." And a simple calculation shows that the extent of
the benefit in nearly all instances has been enough to overweigh any
detriment that would now occur if a tax on stock appreciation were
enacted.195
191. From 1958 through 1964 corporations earned $170.7 billion and paid $110.0 billion
in dividends. STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr 496, Table 682.
192. 1962 INDIVIDUAL INCOmE TAX RETURNS 188.
193. See text accompanying notes 26-40 supra.
194. See note 49 supra.
195. Pre-1963 rates went as high as 91 per cent, see 1962 INDIVIDUAL INcOME TAX RZ-
TURNS 188, but the calculation will be carried out for a taxpayer in only a 60 per cent
bracket. Assuming a half-passed-on corporation income tax, $100 of corporate profits is
reduced to $74, and $50 paid out as dividends is subject to a 60 per cent individual income
tax and so reduced to $20. The shareholder's after-tax income is thus the sum of the $24
retained by the corporation after its taxes plus the $20 left in the shareholder's pocket
after he has paid his own taxes on his dividends, or $44. Taxed directly and only once on
all his profits at a 60 per cent rate, the shareholder would have had $40 left. So he benefited
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V. Conclusion
The principal justification for favorable tax treatment of corporate
stock appreciation is that an investment in stock constitutes an invest-
ment in production facilities. But once a share is issued, the invest-
ment in production facilities is complete and can hardly justify a tax
immunity for as long as the share is outstanding. It is said, however,
that a market for new stock must be continuously maintained by promis-
ing it the same tax freedom as is accorded the old. Even this secondary
argument is weak when applied to public stock. The value of outstand-
ing public shares is immense, and public corporations have demon-
strated not only that they can, but that they prefer to obtain capital with-
out issuing new stock. It is at least questionable that the preservation of
a.n insignificant and disdained market is worth the loss of about $15 to
$25 billion in annual revenue to the government and the destruction of
virtually all correspondence between tax liability and ability to pay.
In any event, the choice is unnecessary. Fixed-term immunities on
new issues would maintain the market in spite of a tax on outstanding
shares. Such a system would, in fact, increase the attractiveness of
new shares in the total market.
The other possible justification for favorable tax treatment of stock
is that it represents an effective instrument of corporate control. But
no shred of operational control remains in the public shareholder, and
the little, largely formal, power he still has over the election of
directors and the disposition of facilities on a sale or merger would be
unaffected by the removal of his tax privileges. What the public share-
holder actually has is only a bare claim on corporate income-no more
than an "uncashed check" payable to bearer in the amount of the
latest market quote. On established principles, in the absence of the
mystique of "investment," the shareholder's claim would clearly be
taxable as current income.
$4 per year. Using a discount rate of only 6 per cent, $4 per year from 1940 through 1965
would amount to $300 today.
Now assume that the individual income tax is made applicable to appreciation as well
as dividends. $100 of corporate profits would be reduced to $74 by the unpassed-on portion
of the corporation income tax, just as before. The entire $74 would now be taxed to the
shareholder at the rate of 60 per cent, however, rather than only that portion distributed
as dividends. The retained portion would be manifested as an increase in the value of his
stock, and be taxed as appreciation. So his individual income tax would be 60 per cent
of $74, or $44.40. His $100 of corporate profits would suffer a total reduction of $74A0:
$26 from the corporation income tax plus $44.40 from the individual income tax. That is
$10.40 more than he would have had to pay had there been no corporation income tax
and he had instead been taxed directly and only once on all of his portion of the corpora-
tion's profits. The present value of $10A0 per year from now to eternity discounted at
6 per cent is $178. The loss is thus only slightly more than half the gain already realized.
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The results of the present tax treatment of corporate stock owner-
ship are easy to see: the prices of public stocks are inflated and the
great majority of shares are held by the very rich, who benefit most
from their favorable tax treatment. The wealthy have been allowed to
bypass the "progressive" individual income tax, because they are able
to cast a large portion of their income in the form of stock appreciation.
Those with earned incomes are virtually left to bear the burden of the
tax alone, at a time when the earned-income occupations of adminis-
trator, scientist and professional are needed more than ever before
and when the public corporation and its related financial institutions
are rendering the individual holder of accumulated wealth almost
economically superfluous. Whatever concentration of individual
wealth is considered desirable could be more fairly maintained by
taxing public stock and high earned income alike and, if necessary,
lowering the rates on both.
The administrative difficulties of taxing public stock appreciation
seem surprisingly few. The national exchanges already supply both the
price information that would make annual taxation feasible and the
ready market that is one of the principal justifications for it. Com-
puters could hold and marshal the needed market data and produce it
at year end for public use. The necessary exceptions for new issues
and corporate reorganizations are relatively simple and seem workable.
Perhaps most significantly, the recognition that public stock appreci-
ation is taxable income would effect an unprecedented redistribution
of large-company stock. For the first time, those with moderate incomes
would hold large numbers of public shares. Purchases by institutional
trusts and funds that confer their benefits on a broad section of the
population would be further stimulated. The nation as a whole, which
through government grants and the money spent on corporate prod-
ucts, has for decades paid for nearly all corporate research and expan-
sion, would finally begin to receive a fair share of the profits.
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